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IN THE SUPREME C·OUR T 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE M. DONAHUE, BARBARA 
DONAHUE, and CONSTANCE 
DONAHUE, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
WARNER BROTHERS PICTURES 
DISTRIBUTING CORPORA-
TION, INTERMOUNTAIN 
THEATRES, INC., ARCH E. 
OVERMAN and C. E. OVERMAN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 7965 
Appellant's Brief 
This appeal concerns itself primarily with Sections 
76-4-8 and 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as applied to 
certain facts which are, in the main, undisputed. 
The case itself has had a career in the courts, Fed-
eral and State, which manifests the uncertainty of under-
standing and diversity of views of those- who have had 
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the responsibility for decision, and in the trial court a 
complete conflict as to meaning of the applicable law be-
tween the laws as set forth in the instructions to the jury 
and as set forth in the Declaratory Judgment. In view 
of the importance of the subject matter involved a more 
complete statement of the facts, pleadings, instructions, 
requested and given, and history of the case is required. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
HISTORY OF THE CASE 
This case, originally filed in the State court, was 
removed to the Federal Court by defendants (R. 10); 
where the deposition of plaintiff Alice M. Donahue was 
taken (R. 64), and certain interrogatories were pro-
poun~ed by each party to the other to which answers 
were made (R. 33, 78); an amended complaint was :filed 
by plaintiff (R. 47) ; a motion for summary judgment 
was made by defendants; was granted by the District 
Court (R. 26); an appeal was taken therefrom by plain-
tiffs to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit; 
after several hearings in the Circuit Court of Appeals 
the lower court was reversed by three to two decision 
(R. 24); mandate filed in the District Court (R. 25); and 
then by appropriate proceedings under the Federal Rules 
and by stipulation and agreement by the parties re-
manded to the State Court (R. 61); preliminary proceed-
ings had before the State court (Judge Martin Larson) 
with reference to defenses interposed by defendants (R. 
63); plaintiffs moved for permission to file an amend-
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ment to their complaint (R. 67) .which was denied (R. 70); 
and thereafter the .case 'vas tried before the Honorable 
Ray VanCott, Jr., and jury and a verdict of no cause of 
a"~tion entered (R. 173). 
STATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff Alice M. Donahue is the widow (R. 206) 
and the other plaintiffs are the daughters (R. 213) of 
Jack Donahue, who was during his lifetime a famous 
dancer and comedian (R. 214). He was also the author 
of several articles (R. 2i4), a book (R. 215) and one 
play. He appeared on the American stage in vaudeville 
and in several plays in which he was starred or co-starred 
(R. 218-223). Among other plays he appeared as co-star 
with Marilyn Miller in two plays (R. 220). He died on 
the 16th day of October, 1930, leaving a widow and three 
daughters, plaintiffs, and one daughter, Alma, who has 
died since this action was commenced (R. 194). Plaintiffs 
are all residents of the State of California. They have 
never lived in Utah. 
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., a corporation, not 
served with process in this action, made a motion picture, 
''Look for the Silver Lining'', in which Ray Bolger pur-
ported to impersonate and use the name of Jack Donahue 
(R. 226) and June Haver purported to impersonate and 
use the name of Marilyn Miller (R. 226). The play 
centered around what was· purported to be the lives of 
Jack Donahue and Marilyn Miller and featuring what 
was purported to be scenes, songs and dances in which 
Marilyn Miller and Jack Donahue were supposed to have 
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been the central figures during their lives (R. 226-227). 
Excepting for the fact that Jack Donahue was a famous 
actor, dancer and entertainer and did, during his lifetime, 
appear and co-star with Marilyn Miller in the two plays 
''Rosalie'' and ''Sonny'', the portrayal of Jack Donahue 
in the motion picture ''Look for the Silver Lining'' was 
purely fictional and untrue to fact (R. 229). The por-
trayal of Jack Donahue's personality by the actor Ray 
Bolger was not an accurate portrayal of Jack Donahue's 
personal characteristics ( R. 229-30) and in one scene 
Jack Donahue is shown as having met Marilyn Miller in 
London and having shown her a picture of his child in 
1913 or 1914, a time prior to his marriage and the birth 
of either of his daughters (R. 231). Jack Donahue was 
never married to anyone but plaintiff Alice M. Donahue. 
The motion picture, ''Look for the Silver Lining'', was 
objectionable to plaintiffs (R. 234) and caused them per-
sonal distress, embarrassment and humiliation (R. 235, 
340, 355). 
Plaintiffs never consented in writing or otherwise 
to the use of the name, portrait or picture of Jack Dona-
hue by Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc., or any of the 
defendants (R. 95). 
The plaintiffs saw the picture at Warner Bros. 
Theatre in California in March of 1949 (R. 245). They 
never saw it in Utah (R. 225). 
Mr. Preston D. Richards, then attorney for plaintiffs, 
wrote to defendants respectively on the 16th day of 
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August, 1949, and the 16th day of September, 1949, pro-
testing against the exhibition of the picture in Utah and 
advising them of the law prohibiting the same. See Ex-
hibits G, H, I, J and K. 
The picture was distributed by defendant Warner 
Bros. Pictures Dist. Corporation to many exhibitors in 
Utah and was exhibited by those theatres, including the 
defendant Intermountain Theaters and Overmans, be-
tween the 14th day of September, 1949 and the 1st day 
of August, 1950. See Exhibit "A" as to dates, times of 
showing, period of run and terms of rental. 
The defendants admit and allege they intend to 
exhibit and re-exhibit the picture in the future. 
It was stipulated that the motion picture shown in 
Utah was the same as the one that plaintiffs had seen 
in California ( R. 225). 
Plaintiffs testified that they were embarrassed, 
humiliated and distressed by the exhibition in Utah (R. 
248, 345, 356). 
The evidence offered by defendants consisted solely 
of scrapbooks of the memento's of Jack Donahue's career, 
the showing of the picture ''Look for the Silver Lining'' 
to the court and jury and the testimony offered over the 
timely objections of plaintiffs by educators as to the 
purported educational and instructive possibilities of 
the picture. 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial. court, in its instructions, left up to the 
jury only the issue of damages for injury to the feelings 
of plaintiffs and the following: 
(1) Whether the motion picture "Look for the Sil-
ver Lining'' is essentially informative and educational; 
and 
(2) Whether the exhibition of the motion picture 
was for purposes of trade. 
After a verdict of no cause of action was entered, 
the trial court considered defendants' claim for Declara-
tory Judgment and entered the following Judgment: 
"DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
'' 1. The plaintiffs have no right as against 
the defendant Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing 
Corporation, or as against the defendant Inter-
mountain Theatres, Inc., or as against the defend-
ants Arch E. and C. E. Overman, to recover dam-
ages for injury to their feelings or sensibilities by 
reason of either past or future distributions or 
exhibitions of the motion picture 'Look for the 
Silver Lining', or by reason of any past or future 
distributions or exhibitions of any other or similar 
type motion picture films portraying the said de-
ceased Jack Donahue. The plaintiffs also have no 
right as against any of the defendants to an in-
junction to restrain or enjoin any future distribu-
tions or exhibitions of the said motion picture or 
of any other or similar type motion picture films 
portraying the said deceased Jack Donahue. 
'' 2. Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the Utah 
Code Annotated (1943) accords the plaintiffs no 
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right to impose any prior restraint or in any man-
ner to restrict, prqhibit, censor or enjoin the 
aforesaid distributions and exhibitions of the 
motion picture 'Look for the Silver Lining' or of 
any other or similar type motion picture films 
containing factual or fictional portrayals of a de-
ceased public figure such as Jack Donahue. 
'' 3. The distribution and exhibition of the mo-
tion picture 'Look for the Silver Lining' and of 
other and similar type motion picture films con-
taining factual or fictional portrayals of deceased 
public figures such as Jack Donahue are protected 
by the free speech and press provisions of the 
Utah State and the United States Constitutions, 
and Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the Utah Code 
Annotated ( 1943) are not applicable to the dis-
tribution or exhibition of motion picture films 
containing such portrayals of ·deceased public 
figures. 
'' 4. The factual or fictional portrayals of de-
ceased public figures such as Jack Donahue in mo-
tion picture films and the distribution and exhibi-
tion of motion picture films containing such por-
trayals do not constitute a use of the name, por-
trait or picture of a person for advertising pur-
poses or for purposes of trade within the meaning 
or intent of Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 -of the 
Utah Code Annotated (1943). 
"5. The applicable conflict of laws rule of the 
State of Utah requires that the rights and liabili-
ties of the parties herein be determined by the 
law of the place where the plaintiffs sustained in-
jury and damage, if any, to their feelings and sen-
sibilities. Since the injury and damage, if any, to 
the feelings and sensibilities of the plaintiffs 
herein necessarily must occur in the State of Cali-
fornia where the plaintiffs have at all times· re-
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sided, the rights and liabilities of the parties are 
to be determined under the laws of that State. 
Under the laws of the State of California, the 
plaintiffs have no right of action or right to relief 
of any kind for injury or damage to their feelings 
and sensibilities by reason of the factual or fic-
tional portrayal of a deceased relative, who, dur-
ing his lifetime, was a prominent public figure. 
''6. The defendant, Warner Bros. Pictures 
Distributors Corporation, has the right to distri-
bute and re-distribute, and the defendants, Inter-
mountain Theatres, Inc., and Arch E. and C. E. 
Overman, have the right to exhibit and re-exhibit 
in the State of Utah, the aforesaid motion picture 
'Look for the Silver Lining', also other and simi-
lar type motion picture films, free of all past and 
future claims or assertions of claims on the part 
of the plaintiffs or any of them based upon the 
provisions of Section 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the 
Utah Code Annotated (1943)." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The trial court erred in denying the motion of 
plaintiffs for leave to file the proposed amendment to 
their complaint. 
2. The trial court erred in its ruling that the deci-
sion of the Circuit Court of Appeals was not the law of 
the case. 
3. The trial court erred in its ruling that the plain-
tiffs were limited in their damages to injury to feelings 
and in instructing the jury to that effect. 
4. The trial court erred in refusing to direct a ver-
dict for plaintiffs. 
5. Under the uncontradicted evidence plaintiffs \\rere 
entitled to a judgment and verdict for: 
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(a) Actual damages suffered. 
(b) Exemplary damages. 
6. The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' mo-
tion for new trial. 
7. The trial court erred in making and entering its 
Declaratory Judgment. 
8. The trial court erred in its conclusion of law that 
the defendants should prevail in their contentions as to 
construction of Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of Utah Code 
Annotated 1943. 
9. The trial court erred in its conclusion of law that 
defendants should be granted the relief prayed for in 
their counterclaims. 
10. The trial court erred in Declaratory Judgment in 
decreeing as follows : 
(a) That plaintiffs have no right to recover dam-
ages against defendants or either of them by reason 
of the past or future exhibition of the motion picture 
''Look for the Silver Lining''. 
(b) That plaintiffs have no right to an injunction 
to restrain and enjoin future distributions and exhi-
bitions of said motion picture or any other motion 
picture portraying the said deceased Jack Donahue. 
(c) That Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of Utah 
Code Annotated 1943 accord to plaintiffs no right to 
impose any prior restraint or in any manner to re-
strict, prohibit, censor or enjoin the distribution or 
exhibition of said picture or any other or similar type 
of motion picture containing factual or fictional por-
trayal of Jack Donahue or other deceased public 
figures. 
(d) That such distribution and exhibition of the 
motion picture and other similar type of motion pic-
tures are protected by the free speech and press pro-
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visions of the Utah State and United States Consti-
tutions. 
(e) That Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 are hot ap-
plicable to the distribution and exhibition of motion 
picture films containing such portrayals of deceased 
public figures. 
(f) That factual or fictional portrayals of de-
ceased public figures such as Jack Donahue do not 
constitute a use of the :q.ame, portrait or picture of a 
person for advertising purposes or purposes of trade 
within the meaning or intent of the Utah statutes. 
(g) That the rights and liabilities of the parties 
should be determined by the laws of the State of Cali-
fornia. 
(h) That the defendants have the right to distri-
bute ·and redistribute and the right to exhibit and 
re-exhibit said picture and other and similar type of 
pictures. 
11. The trial court erred in permitting the witness 
Dr. Lorin F. Wheelwright, over the objection of plain-
tiffs, to answer the following question : ''I wonder if you 
would tell the court and jury whether or not in your 
opinion, this film, 'Look for the Silver Lining', has edu-
cational value~", and in permitting the witness to state 
why he thought· that it had such educational value; also 
in stating his opinion as to the effect of fictionalization 
upon the educational value of the film. 
12. The trial court erred in permitting the witness 
Lilla Belle Pitts to answer, over the objection of plain-
tiffs, the question, "And did it approve it for educational 
purposes ~ ' ' 
13. The trial court erred in permitting the witness 
Lilla Belle Pitts to answer, over the objection of plain-
tiffs, the question, ''Miss Pitts, in seeing this picture, 
'Look for the Silver Lining', did you form an opinion as 
10 
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to whether or not-your personal opinion-as to whether 
or not 'Look for the Silver Lining' had educational 
value?'', and in permitting the 'vitness to state why she 
thought that it had such educational value; and also in 
stating her opinion as to the effect of fictionalization upon 
the educational value of the film. 
14. The trial court erred in permitting the 'vitness 
Walter Prichard Eaton to answer, over the objection of 
plaintiffs, the question, ''Would this, from your stand-
point as a dramatic critic and a teacher of playwriting, 
would this production be classed as a biographical play 
or something else~", and in permitting the witness to 
state the reasons therefor, and in stating his opinion as 
to the effect of fictionalization on its classification as a 
biographical play. 
15. The trial court erred in permitting the witness 
Walter Prichard Eaton to answer the question, over the 
objection of plaintiffs, ''Professor Eaton, you are famil-
iar, of course, as you have testified, with the creation of 
dramatic plays, dramatic works of all types. Is the crea-
tion and production of a dramatic play or biographical 
play considered a matter of trade~", and in stating the 
reasons for his answer. 
16. The trial court erred in permitting the witness 
Mark A. May to answer, over the objection of plaintiffs, 
the question, "And do you have an opinion as to whether 
or not 'Look for the Silver Lining' is of educational or 
informative value~", and to state his reasons for such 
opinion, and in permitting the witness to state that the 
picture- has been requested to be used for educational 
purposes. 
17. The trial court erred in permitting the witness 
Eric Haight to testify that the motion picture had been 
approved unanimously by the Screening Council of the 
I.J. D. S. Church; and in refusing to strike such evidence. 
11 
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18. The trial court erred in refusing to give plain-
tiffs' requested Instruction No. 1, directing a verdict for 
plaintiffs. 
19. The trial court erred in refusing to give plain-
tiffs' requested instruction No. 4, with reference to the 
exploitation by defendants in Utah of the name of Jack 
Donahue as an element of damages to be considered. 
20. The trial court erred in refusing to give plain-
tiffs' requested instruction No. 6 as requested with refer-
ence to exemplary damages. 
21. The trial court erred in refusing to give plain-
tiffs' requested instruction No. 7 with reference to the 
meaning of ''trade purposes'' as applied to the case. 
22. The trial court erred in refusing to give plain-
tiffs' requested instruction No. 8 or alternate No. 8, with 
reference to the meaning of trade or commercial purposes 
as applied to the Utah statutes. 
23. The trial court erred in refusing to give plain-
tiffs' requested instruction No. 13 with reference to the 
.liability of the respective defendants and the damages 
for which each would be liable. 
24. The trial court erred in refusing to give plain-
tiffs' requested instruction No. 15 relating to the educa-
tional and informative nature of the film as a guide to 
the jury in determining whether or not the motion picture 
was educational or informative. 
25. The trial court erred in giving its instruction No. 
3 with reference to the constitutional provisions relating 
to freedom of the press and freedom of speech. 
26. The trial court erred in giving its instruction No. 
10 with reference to the motion picture being educational 
or informative. 
27. The trial court erred in giving instruction No. l:l 
with reference to waiver of rights of privacy by the de-
ceased Jack Donahue or plaintiffs. 
12 
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28. The court erred in giving paragraph "c" of in-
struction No. 14 excluding the theory of damage to prop-
erty rights. 
29. The trial court erred in instructing the jury in 
instruction No. 14 that the jury should take into con-
sideration the fact that the plaintiffs were physically 
present in California at the time of the showing in Utah 
of the film. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, lO(a) (b) (c) (e) (h), 
and 18. 
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
DAMAGES AND TO HAVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
ON THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE IN THE 
RECORD. 
The question involved in these points is as to 
whether, under the uncontradicted evidence, plaintiffs 
were entitled to recover damages and have injunctive 
relief as a matter of law under the Utah statute. 
The provisions of the statute are as follows: 
'' 103-4-8. Use of N arne or Picture of Individual. 
Any person who uses for advertising purposes 
or for purposes of trade, or upon any postal card, 
the name, portrait or picture of any person, if 
such person is living, without first having obtained 
the written consent of such person, or, if a minor, 
of his parent or guardian, or if such person is 
dead, without the written consent of his heirs or 
personal representatives, is guilty of a misde-
meanor.'' 
13 
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'' 103-4-9. I d. Civil Liability. 
Any living person, or the heirs or personal 
representatives of any deceased person, whose 
name, portrait or picture is used within this state 
for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade, 
without the \Yritten consent first obtained as pro-
vided in the next preceding section may maintain 
an action against such person so using his name, 
picture or portrait to prevent and restrain the use 
thereof; and may in the same action recover 
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of 
such use, and, if the defendant shall have know-
ingly used such person's name, portrait or picture 
in such manner as is declared to be unlawful, the 
jury or court, if tried without a jury, in its dis-
cretion, may a ward exemplary damages.'' 
That seems to be clear, understandable and right in 
point as applied to the uncontradicted facts established 
by the evidence. If the statute means what it says, the 
only questions vvhich should have been presented to the 
jury should have had to do with the question of damages, 
general and punitive; and the court should have con-
cerned itself only with the matter of the injunction. 
This statute has never been before this court for 
construction or interpretation in any case, probably 
because it is so plain in its terms that people have 
avoided violating its clear and unambiguous provisions. 
It is a misnomer to say that this statute is an official 
enactment of the law of privacy in this State. It does 
that and more. It is in fact broader than the law of 
pr1vacy. It is a legislative enactment conferring on the 
14 
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heirs of a deceased individual the right to protect his 
name, picture or portrait from commercial exploitation 
\\'i.thout their "~ritten consent, making it a crime to vi<;>late 
that right, and creating the right to a cause of action for 
damages and injunctive process therefor in favor of the 
heirs. It is, therefore, strictly a statutory right over, 
above and beyond and distinct from the right of privacy, 
the common law right recognized by most States. The 
statutory enactment does, however, have the effect of 
recognizing the common law right of privacy in the State 
of Utah. The two should not, however, be confused. 
Decisions involving the law of privacy are not, therefore, 
entirely in point on all phases of the subject matter of 
this action, but they do involve to a limited extent similar 
principles. 
We call attention of the court to an important point 
with reference to the statute: There is no difference 
between living and deceased persons as to what may or 
may not be done. The only difference is as to who has 
the right to the cause of action. Plainly speaking, if 
defendants are held by this court to have acted within 
their rights as to plaintiffs, then it necessarily follows 
that the same thing can happen in Utah to living people. 
If plaintiffs, as heirs of Jack Donahue, have no rights 
in this case, neither would a living person have any right 
to complain if the same thing happens to them. In Utah 
the doors will be wide open to the commercial exploita-
tion of the names, pictures, and portraits of all, living 
and dead, if done by the movie industry. 
15 
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The effect, of course, is to ask this court to repeal 
the statute or write into it exceptions which will nullify 
its applicability to the movie industry. In other words, 
the law as announced by this court in this case, under 
the Utah statute, applies to both the living and the dead 
alike, if your name happens to be valuable for box office 
appea~. If they can use the name of Jack Donahue, they 
can use the name of anyone, living or dead, whether 
residents of this State or not, for the same purpose, and 
the more famous the name the greater the temptation 
and the more abundant the financial harvest. 
The bars will be down and no man's name, picture 
or portrait will be safe from those who will seek to 
exploit his fame. All they will have to say is: It is the 
movie industry that is doing it; it is biographical; it is 
fit to be seen by students; it teaches something that 
students of some sort want to see; it will entertain the 
girl students while the boys take their military drill. 
That is what the trial court in this case, in the Declara-
tory Judgment, announced the law to be. That is what 
the trial court, in its rulings on the evidence and in some 
of its instructions to the jury on the damage question, 
said to the jury. The trial court, in fact, contradicted 
itself, both in its instructions to the jury and in its law 
as announced to the jury in some of its instructions and 
as announced in the Declaratory Judgment. The Declara-
tory Judgment completely disregarded the statute; ig-
nored the common law right of privacy as adopted and 
enlarged by the statute, and refused to recognize the 
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right of action which the statute creates, as applicable 
to the movie industry. 
Courts, without statutory enactment, have long rec-
ognized and given effect to rights that were essentially 
the same as the right of privacy and have recognized the 
name, portrait, picture and personality of an individual 
as a personal right and a property right that could not 
be used or exploited by others for advertising, commer-
cial trade purposes, or in fact for any material purpose, 
"\\ithout his consent. It reaches back through England 
to ancient Greece and Rome. Some courts based their 
decisions on the theory of a property right, some under 
the right of contract, and some under Constitutional 
guarantees of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 
As an independent right with a title, in its modern sense, 
in America, it had its inception in an article written in 
the Harvard Law Review by Warren and Brandeis in 
1890, 4 Harvard Law Review 193. Not all courts imme-
diately adopted the doctrine which had primarily to do 
with injury to feelings and was described as the right 
to be let alone in one's private life, past and present, and 
to which right of action, unlike slander and libel, the 
truth was no defense. 
41 Am. Juris., Sees. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 13, under Privacy. 
One of the courts that refused to recognize the doc-
trine was the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, 
which in Roberson vs. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 
N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, by a bare majority vote decided 
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that a young lady whose picture had been used to adver-
tise flour had no cause of action. Judge Gray wrote a 
dissenting opinion in that case which has become equally 
famous with the Warren and Brandeis article as one of 
the foundation documents in this branch of the law. His 
entire dissenting opinion is an historic pronouncement 
because of its immediate effect and because it has become 
the basis of decisions by other courts which, without 
statutory action, adopted the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Gray as sound law. We quote the following from that 
·dissenting opinion: 
"In the social evolution, with the march of the 
arts and sciences and in the resultant effects upon 
organized society, it is quite intelligible that new 
conditions must arise in personal relations which 
the rules of the common law, cast in the rigid mold 
of an earlier social status, were not designed to 
meet. It would be a reproach to equitable juris-
prudence if equity \vere power less to extend the 
application of the principles of common law or of 
natural justice in remedying a. wrong which, in 
the progress of civilization, has been made pos-
sible as the result of new social or commercial 
conditions. * * * Security of person is as neces-
sary as the security of property; and for that 
complete personal security which will result in 
the peaceful and wholesome enjoyment of one's 
privileges as a member of society, there should 
be afforded protection, not only against the scan-
dalous portraiture and display of one's features 
and person, but against the display and use there-
of for another's commercial purposes or gain.'' 
The reaction to this decision "Tas immediate. ThP 
next session of the New York Legislature enacted a la,v· 
I 
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similar to that in Utah but making it applicable to living 
persons only. 
Utah followed suit in 1909 by enacting the present 
statutes ·w·hich have been known to be the law to the 
present time. 
Today the majority opinion in the Roberson case is 
repudiated by practically all courts. 
What \Yas the evil that the statute was intended to 
stop1 What ,,~ere the rights that the statute was intended 
to safeguard J? The evil \vas so great that both New York 
and Utah made it a crime as well as the basis for damages 
and injunctive relief. They were not content to let the 
matter rest on damages only. 
In reading some New York decisions under the 
statute, it must be remembered that there is a basic dif-
ference between New York and Utah in the interpretation 
of penal statutes. In New York they are strictly con-
strued as penal in nature. In Utah both by statute and 
decision they are liberally construed to effect the pur-
pose intended. 
The most recent case, directly in point, on our own 
facts, is the recent decision of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, Tenth Circuit, in this very case, reversing the 
District Court which had granted a motion for Summary 
Judgment on these same facts, which facts are not sub-
stantially different as produced in the evidence from 
those considered and assumed in the Federal Court, and 
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which the majority opinion said stated a cause of action. 
See the mandate (R. 24-25), and which opinion is re-
corded at 194 Fed. 2d 6. The entire opinion is right in 
point. We quote pertinent parts as follows : 
"The action was one for legal and equitable 
relief for the wrongful violation of the right of 
privacy. The right of privacy may be defined in 
general language as the right of the ordinary 
person to enjoy life without his name or life being 
exploited for commercial purposes by the use of 
his name, or the publication or portrayal of his 
picture, or career, on the moving picture screen, 
in the press, in periodicals, in handbills, in circu-
lars, in catalogues, or in other like manner unless 
his consent thereto be first obtained. The right 
is sometimes referred to as the right to be let 
alone. The principles together with their limita-
tions or qualifications having appropriate appli-
cation to the right of privacy were presented with 
erudite ability in an article written by Warren 
and Brandeis and published in 1890, 4 Harvard 
Law Review 190. One of the early cases in Amer-
ican jurisprudence dealing \vith the right was 
Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22, de-
cided a few years after publication of the article 
to which reference has just been made. There a 
nephew of a deceased aunt, on behalf of himself 
and other immediate surviving relatives of the 
deceased, sought to enjoin the exhibition of a 
statue of the deceased without the consent of 
plaintiff and other surviving relatives. The court 
held that whatever right of privacy the aunt had 
terminated at her death and did not pass to her 
heirs or relatives; that plaintiff and other sur-
viving relatives did not represent any right of 
privacy which she had during her lifetime; and 
that plaintiff and other surviving relatives were 
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not entitled to injunctive relief on the ground that 
the exhibition of the statue would constitute an 
inYasion of their personal feelings or sentiments 
concerning the memory of the deceased. In Rober-
son Y. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 
64 N. E. 442, plaintiff was a young woman whose 
photograph or likeness had been appropriated for 
advertising purposes by a milling company. She 
sought damages for past wrongful use of the 
photograph or likeness and also an injunction to 
restrain future use of it. It was said in the opinion 
of the court that the legislature c~uld very well 
provide that no one should be permitted for his 
own selfish purpose to use the name or picture of 
another for advertising purposes without his con-
sent, but that the legislature had not done so. And 
it was held that in the absence of legislation to 
that effect, plaintiff was without remedy in the 
courts. At its next session after that case was 
decided, and primarily in response to the sugges-
tion contained in the opinion of the court, the 
legislature of New York enacted sections 50 and 
51 of the Civil Rights Law of that state making 
penal the use of one's name, picture or portrait 
for advertising purposes, or for purposes of trade, 
without his written consent being obtained, and 
creating a civil right to damages for past wrong 
of that character as well as injunctive relief to 
prevent future wrong. For an authentic statement 
of that historic fact as a contributing factor to the 
enactment of the statute, see Rhodes v. Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co., 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097, 
affirmed 220 U. S. 502. 
"The legislature of Utah in the enactment of 
sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9, supra, followed with-
out deviation or departure the statute in New 
York in respect to the exploitation for commercial 
purposes, or for purposes of trade, the name, pic-
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ture, or portrait of a living person without his 
written consent being first obtained. But the legis-
lature of Utah did not stop there. In section 
103-4-8 it also made penal the use for advertising 
purposes, or purposes of trade, the name, portrait, 
or picture of a deceased person, without the writ-
ten consent of his heirs or personal representa-
tives; and in section 103-4-9 it also provided with 
blueprinted clarity that the heirs or personal rep-
resentatives of a deceased person shall be entitled 
to recover damages for injuries sustained by the 
wrongful use for advertising purposes, or for 
purposes of trade, of the name, portrait, or pic-
ture of the deceased person, and shall be entitled 
to restrain further or continued exploitation of 
that kind. By section 103-4-9, the legislature 
created the right of a living person to recover 
damages for such wrongful use of his name, por-
trait, or picture, and to enjoin further exploita-
tion thereof; and in addition, it created a like right 
in the heirs or personal representatives of a de-
ceased person whose name, portrait, or picture 
has been or is being used in that manner without 
first obtaining the consent in writing of the heirs 
or personal representatives. The statute created 
an independent right and provided a remedy for 
its enforcement. The purpose of the statute was 
to grant protection against the appropriation for 
commercial purposes of one's name, picture, or 
personality. And it should be given a liberal 
rather than a narro\v construction. It should be 
construed liberally in the light of the legislative 
intent and purpose, not in the narrow manner 
which would tend to proscribe achievement of th0 
desired legislative objective. Sarat Lahiri v. Daily 
Mirror, 295 N.Y.S. 382; .J a.ckson v. Consum0r Pub-
lications, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 691; Cf. Castle v. Delta 
Land & Water Co., 58 Utah 137, 197 Par. 584. 
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''A statute undertaking to forbid publication 
in the press or elsewhere of matters essentially 
educational or informative in character, or under-
taking to prohibit the use of matters of that kind 
on the motion p'icture screen, would immediately 
suggest its own fatal infirmity. And similarly, a 
statute essaying to prevent the publication of cur-
rent news, or the recounting or portrayal of actual 
events of public interest as is conventionally done 
in a conventional newspaper or in a conventional 
newsreel on the motion picture screen, would be 
promptly challenged in respect to its validity on 
recognized grounds of long established principles 
of law. But this statute does not undertake to for-
bid any, every, and all use of the name, picture, 
or personality of an individual without written 
consent being first obtained. It is expressly con-
fined to the appropriation of the name, picture, or 
personality of an individual for advertising pur-
poses, or for purposes of trade. It is explicitly 
limited to exploitation of that kind. It does not 
undertake to forbid publication in the press or 
elsewhere of· matters essentially educational or 
informative, even though the name or picture of 
an individual is used incidentally in connection 
therewith. Neither does it undertake to prevent 
the dissemination of news in which the public has 
an interest in the press, on the motion picture 
screen in the form of a newsreel, or .otherwise, 
even though the name or picture of an individual 
is used incidentally in that connection. Binns v. 
Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N. E. 
1108, L. R. A. 1915C 839; Humiston v. Universal 
Film Mfg. Co., 178 N. Y. S. 752; Kreiger v. Popu-
lar Publications, 3 N.Y.S. {2d) 480. 
''Fairly construed, the amended complaint al-
leged in substance that with minor exceptions the 
moving picture in question was untrue; that it 
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was essentially a product of fiction; and that as a 
part thereof, the name, picture, and personality of 
Donahue were used for purposes of trade, without 
the consent of plaintiffs being first obtained in the 
manner required by the statute. While by answer 
many of the material allegations contained in the 
amended complaint were denied, the motion for 
summary judgment admitted all matters well 
pleaded in such complaint. That was the posture 
of the case at the time the summary judgment was 
entered. The manufacture, distribution, and exhi-
bition of a motion picture of the kind pleaded in 
the amended complaint, based primarily upon fic-
tion or the imaginative, and designed primarily 
to entertain and amuse an audience desiring enter-
tainment and willing to pay therefor, does not con-
stitute the publication .or information and educa-
tional matters, or the dissemination of news, or 
the recounting or portrayal of actual events of 
public interest in the form of a newsreel, as dis-
tinguished from commercial activities for gain or 
profit, within the intent and meaning of the 
statute. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 
supra; Humiston v. Universal Film Manufactur-
ing Co., supra; Krieger v. Popular Publications, 
supra. According to the amended complaint, 
Donahue had been dead many years at the time 
of the institution of the action. And of course 
another person necessarily portrayed him in the 
moving picture. But his name was used and the 
moving picture purported to portray his person-
ality and career. It was not alleged in the amend-
ed complaint that use was made of an actual 
photograph or portrait of Donahue. But that was 
unnecessary, as a picture within the meaning of 
the statute includes any representation of the 
person. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 
supra. To hold that the use of the name and the 
representation of the personality of Donahue in 
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the manner alleged in the amended complaint fails 
to come within the purview of the statute would 
narro"" the statute by a tortured construction not 
in harmony ''"·ith its plain legislative intent and 
purpose. 
''Endeavoring to sustain the summary judg-
ment, appellees present the argument that Dona-
hue was a public figure and that the statute does 
not forbid the use of the name or picture of such 
a figure without consent first being obtained. As 
previously indicated, it was averred in the amend-
ed complaint that Donahue was a dancer, singer, 
outstanding comedian, and foremost entertainer; 
that he starred and co-starred in productions in 
New York; that he did not appear in motion pic-
tures or night clubs; that he wrote certain articles; 
and that in collaboration with another person, he 
wrote the script for a show. The statute was not 
intended to protect in undiminished degree the 
privacy of a public figure. By becoming a public 
:figure, one may relinquish in part the right of 
privacy which would be his under other circum-
stances. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F. 
( 2d) 806, 138 A.L.R. 15, certiorari denied, 311 U. 
S. 711. The right may be waived completely or 
only in part. It may be waived for one purpose, 
and still be asserted for another. But the exist-
ence of the waiver carries with it the right to 
invade the right of privacy of the individual only 
to the extent legitimately necessary and proper in 
dealing with the matter which gave rise to the 
waiver. The question whether a person is a public 
figure and therefore has waived in part his right 
of privacy may rest upon various and variable 
facts and circumstances. And no rule of thumb 
has been evolved for its easy solution in all cases. 
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 
Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 69 L. R. A. 101. We find our;. 
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selves unable to share the view that Donahue's 
accomplishments as a dancer, singer, comedian, 
entertainer, and writer, made him such a public 
figure that his name, picture, or career could be 
dramatized in a motion picture photoplay based 
primarily upon fiction and the picture exhibited 
in Utah for commercial purposes, without violat-
ing the right of privacy which the statute was 
intended to protect. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne 
& Heath, 68 N.Y.S. (2d) 779. 
''In a further effort to uphold the summary 
judgment, appellees contend in substance that if 
the statute be construed as broad enough to pro-
hibit the portrayal of a deceased public figure it 
would constitute an unreasonable restraint upon 
the guaranteed freedoms· of speech and press. It 
is argued in support of the contention that dealing 
fictionally with deceased public figures is an im-
portant part of our culture, and the right to do so 
is one which is necessary for the survival of our 
culture; that in modern times the portraying of 
deceased public figures fictionally is one of the 
most common forms of artistic creation in the 
novel, drama, and motion picture; that motion 
pictures fictionalizing historical characters and 
events are common media of communicating ideas; 
and that to interpret the statute in such manner 
as to prevent the fictionalizing of a deceased pub-
lic figure would constitute a restraint upon the 
freedom of that mode of expression, in violation 
of the constitutional guaranty of freedom of 
speech and of press. If the statute undertook to 
restrict or forbid the publication of matters edu-
cational or informative or strictly biographical 
in character, or the dissemination of news in the 
form of a newsreel or otherwise, it would be open 
to challenge on the ground of objectionable re-
straint upon the freedo'fn of speech and press. But 
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it does nothing of the kind. It is content to forbid 
the appropriation of the name, picture, or per-
sonality of an individual for commercial purposes, 
or for purposes of trade, as distinguished from 
the publication of matters educational or infor-
mative or purely biographical in kind, or the dis-
semination of ne"~s in the form of a newsreel or 
other,Yise. And the constitutional guaranty of 
free speech and free press in its full sweep does 
not undertake to create an inviolate asylum for 
unbridled appropriation or exploitation of the 
name, picture, or personality of a deceased public 
figure for purely commercial purposes, or solely 
for purposes of trade, with the state powerless to 
enact appropriate forbidding or remedial legis-
lation.'' 
That is the law of this case. While this court is not 
bound to follow the Tenth Circuit as to its interpretation 
of the Utah statute, it should do so in deciding the rights 
of these parties; and the decision of that group of 
eminent jurists should be very persuasive, particularly 
on the grounds upon which defendants seek to escape 
liability as hereafter considered. 
It would seem in the face of that decision in this 
case, on the same facts, that the trial court should have 
directed a verdict for plaintiffs, leaving only the matter 
of damages for consideration. 
The evidence given by the witnesses for defendants 
was not germane to the real issue in the case, namely, 
the actual use to which the picture was put. 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINTS 7, 8, 10 (f) and 15 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY, AS REQUESTED BY 
PLAINTIFFS, THAT EXHIBITION OF THE PIC-
TURE WAS FOR PURPOSES OF TRADE WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE AND IN DE-
CREEING IN THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
THAT IT WAS NOT FOR PURPOSES OF TRADE. 
Here, again, the trial court was not consistent with 
itself in its legal pronouncements in this case. 
In its instruction No. 2 it instructed the jury that 
plaintiffs could recover if they proved the allegations of 
their complaint. One of the issues was that the name 
was used for purposes of trade. While defendants denied 
that the exhibition was for purposes of trade, they ad-
mitted the facts, which, in law, constitute trade or com-
mercial purposes. 
The facts as to the nature of the use to which the 
picture was put, being undisputed, it was the duty of 
the trial court to instruct the jury that the name and 
picture of Jack Donahue were used in violation of the 
statute, and that the only question for the jury to decide 
was the quantum of damages. 
It was not possible to draw more than one inference 
from the undisputed facts. The picture 'vas exhibited 
in motion picture theaters in Utah to the public for an 
admission fee to the exhibitor and a rental or license fee 
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to the distributor. There 'Yas no dispute in the evidence 
on those basic facts ; in fact defendants produced no 
sritnesses other than its experts, "·hose evidence is else-
where discussed. The trial court so stated in its instruc-
tion No. 5. 
Also, in its instruction No. 3 the court instructed 
the jury that if the picture was fictional or imaginative 
that it would be a violation of the statute and plaintiffs 
could recover. 
These instructions permitting recovery are in direct 
conflict with the legal pronouncement in the declaratory 
judgment that it was not for purposes of trade. 
Upon the undisputed evidence the trial court should 
have instructed the jury that there was no issue on that 
point and should have instructed them that the exhibi-
tion of ''Look for the Silver Lining'' in the commercial 
theaters in the State of Utah was for purposes of trade 
under the law. 
The trial court in paragraph 4 of its Declaratory 
Judgment held: 
''The factual or fictional portrayals of de-
ceased public figures such as Jack Donahue in 
motion picture films and the distribution and exhi-
bition of motion picture films containing such por-
trayals do not constitute a use of the name, por-
trait or picture of a person for advertising pur-
poses or for purposes of trade within the meaning 
or intent of Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the 
Utah Code Annotated 1943.'' 
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As a general proposition, the distribution and exhi-
bition of motion pictures constitute a trade or commerce. 
Un.ited States vs. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 
· 334 U. S. 131, 92 L. Ed. 1260 
Campbell vs. Motion Picture Machine Operators 
Union, 151 Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781; 27 A.L.R. 
631. 
Indeed, the whole concept of trade, in statutes regulating 
our modern complex industrial and economic life, has 
come a long way from the old concept of trade as being 
limited to the barter or exchange of goods. 
United States v. Associated Press, 326 U. S. 1, 
89 L. Ed. 2013. 
(News gathering and dissemination) 
U. S. vs. Southeastern Underwriters Association, 
322 U. S. 533, 88 L. Ed. 1440 
(Insurance) 
American Medical Association vs. U. S., 
317 U. S. 519, 87 L. Ed. 434. 
(Group medical plans) 
The record in the case at bar shows that the motion pic-
ture ''Look for the Silver Lining'' was sho,vn at numer-
ous houses in Utah, at which admission was charged by 
the exhibitor and a rental exacted by the distributor, 
for all of which the governing factor in these opera-
tions was the profit motive (R. 286). 
The question proposed by the trial court's ruling 
in paragraph No. 4 quoted above is whether the Utah 
Statute gives a narrower meaning to "purposes of 
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trade'' than the connotation of ordinary usage. That 
question may best be answered by referring to the genesis 
of the Utah Statute. In Ne'v York, in Roberson vs. Ro-
chester Folding Box Company, 171 N. Y. 538, 63 N. E. 
442, the New York Court of Appeals determined that in 
the absence of any statute on the subject, there did not 
exist in that State a right of a woman to prevent the use 
of her portrait by others for advertising purposes with-
out her consent. The Chief Justice of the Court in the 
opinion suggested that the right of privacy to that extent 
might be protected by an act of the legislature. Shortly 
after the New York legislature enacted Chapter 132 of the 
Laws of 1903, which is now Sections 50 and 51 of the New 
York Civil Rights Code. In 1908, in Rhodes vs. Sperry 
and Hutchinson, 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097, the consti-
tutionality of that statute was sustained by the New 
York Court of Appeals. In 1909 Utah enacted Chapter 
61, La,vs of Utah, 1909, which are now Sections 103-4-7, 
8 and 9. Placing the language of Section 3 of the Utah 
Act ·and Section 2 of the New York Act side by side 
indicates clearly that most of the language of the Utah 
Act was lifted verbatim from the New York Act. New 
York Section 2 states : 
''Any person whose name, portrait or picture 
is used within this State for advertising purposes 
or for the purposes of trade without the written 
consent first obtained as above provided, may 
maintain an equitable action in the Supreme 
Court of this State against the person, firm or 
corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, 
to prevent and restrain the use thereof and may 
also sue an~ recover damages for any injuries 
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sustained by reason of such use, and if the de-
fendant shall knowingly use such person's name, 
portrait or picture in such a manner as is forbid-
den or declared to be unlawful by this Act, the 
jury in its discretion may award exemplary 
damages.'' 
Utah Section 3 provides: 
''Any living person or the heirs or personal 
representatives of any deceased person whose 
name, portrait or picture is used within this State 
for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade 
without the written consent first obtained as herein 
provided, may maintain an action against such 
person so using his name, picture or portrait, to 
prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may in 
the same action recover damages for any injuries 
sustained by reason of such use, and if the defend-
ant shall have knowingly used such person's name, 
portrait or picture in such a manner as is declared 
to be unlwful by this Act, the jury or court, if tried 
without a jury, in its discretion may award exemp-
lary damages. '' 
(Words added in Utah in italics) 
Therefore, in the absence of anything to the contrary 
being shown as to the intent of the Utah legislature, the 
New York cases on the question of ''purposes of trade'', 
as used in the New York statute, should be persuasive, if 
not controlling. The retention of the language from 1909 
through the various codifications and compilations to the 
new 1953 Code infers an acquiescense by the Utah legis-
lature in the New York decisions and interpretations 
made during that period. 
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50 Am. Jur. Statutes, Sec. 458 
Pointedly enough, the leading New York case on the 
issue is one applying the Statute to motion pictures. 
Binns v. Vitagraph Company, 210 N.Y. 51; 
103 N. E. 1108; L. R. A. 1916 C 839 
decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1913. 
In that case, the defendant was a producer and dis-
tributor of motion picture films. In January 1909, the 
steamships "Republic" and "Florida" came into colli-
sion at sea. The "Republic" was equipped with wireless 
telegraphy instruments and the plaintiff was the opera-
tor. After the collision, he sent a danger signal "C.Q.D." 
which was received by a wireless operator on another 
ship and, as a result, the passengers on the Republic 
were saved. Soon after the date of the collision, the de-
fendant proceeded to make a series of pictures entitled 
''C. Q. D.'', or Saved by Wireless, a true story of the 
wreck of the Republic.'' These pictures were manufac-
tured and made up in the studio of the defendant by the 
use of scenery prepared for the purpose and of actors 
employed to impersonate the plaintiff and others. The 
pictures included the name of Binns and showed him as 
a wireless operator of the Republic. An action was 
brought to enjoin the use of his name in the pictures and 
recover damages. After reviewing the history of the New 
York statute and outlining the evidence as to the making 
of the pictures showing it was done with professional 
actors, the New York court said: 
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''It is not necessary in this opinion to discuss 
the question whether a person, firm, or corpora-
tion would be liable under the statute for making 
and using a picture of a living person, when it is 
included in a picture of an actual event in which 
such person was an actor, and such picture is a 
mere incident to the actual event portrayed. The 
use of the plaintiff's name and picture, as shown 
by the testimony in this case, was not a mere 
incident to a general picture representative of 
the author's understanding of what occurred at 
the wreck of the Republic. The first picture of the 
series was essentially a picture of the plaintiff, 
although included therewith was a place having 
relation to the other parts of the pictures ex-
hibited; but the last picture of the series had no 
connection whatever with any other place or 
/ 7 person or with any event. His alleged personal 
·' movements, as exhibited in the now well-known 
form of moving pictures, had no relation to the 
other pictures, and it was not designed to instruct 
or educate those who saw it. The defendant used 
the plaintiff's alleged picture to amuse those who 
paid to be entertained. If the use of the plaintiff's 
name and picture as shown in this case is not 
within the terms of the statute, then the picture 
of any individual can be similarly made and ex-
hibited for the purpose of showing his peculiari-
ties as of dress and walk, and his personal fads, 
eccentricities, amusements, and even his private 
life. By such pictures an audience would be 
amused and the maker of the films and the exhibi-
tors would be enriched. The greater the exaggera-
tion in such a series of pictures, so long as they 
were not libelous, the greater would be the profit 
of the picture maker and exhibitor. We hold that 
the name and picture of the plaintiff were used 
by the defendant as a matter of business and 
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profit and cont~ra·ry to the prohibition of the 
statute . . . " 
Six years later, 1n Humiston vs. Universal Film 
Manufacturing Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 
752, the Ne'v York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
recognized that the production of motion pictures was 
for purposes of ''trade'' under the decision of the Binns 
case, but held that the production of news reels showing 
a ''truthful picture taken of a current event at the time 
that it happened" 'vas not the use of a name or portrait 
for purposes of advertising or trade and made an analogy 
of a ne"\YS reel to a newspaper. The line between trade 
uses prohibited and those within the realm of the Humis-
ton case was again drawn in 1932 in Blumenthal vs. Pic-
ture Classics, 251 N. Y. S. 800; 235 App. Div. 570. 
In that case, the defendant made movie shorts of 
historical points in New York City. Included were scenes 
in the New York lower East side. It engaged four pro-
fessional actors who posed as guides to two school teach-
ers who were making a tour of the City in order to give 
continuity to the various historical points of interest. 
One of the scenes of the Lower East Side showed the 
plaintiff in her trade of selling bread and rolls on the 
streets. The scene consisted of only nine feet out of a 
total of fifteen hundred and fifty feet and a total of six 
seconds out of seventeen. minutes. The lower court 
granted an injunction pendente lite, and this was affirmed 
by the Appellate Division, both courts holding that the 
portrayal was for purposes of trade. The question was .. 
cited to the New York Court of Appeals and that court 
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refused to pass on the issue of purpose of trade, but held 
that the injunction was properly issued. 
Blumenthal vs. Picture Classics, 261 N. Y. 504; 185 
N. E. 713. 
Concededly 1n "Look for the Silver Lining", the 
producers engaged in dramatic license and fiction to 
create audience appeal. (Testimony of Dr. Wheelwright 
at pages 420-422 of the Record). The biographical ele-
ments of the two principal characters, Marilyn Miller 
and Jack Donahue, were not correct from the point of 
chronology and conjunction. (Testimony of Miss Pitts, 
R. 462). So althol)gh comparable, in the opinion of Miss 
Pitts, to the famous opera ''Die Maestersinger'' (R. 462), 
the motion picture in the case at bar is also more com-
parable to the ''Wreck of the Republic'' in the Binns 
• 
case. 
Another New York case, Martin v. New Metropolitan 
Fiction, 248 N. Y. S. 359, 139 Misc. 290, makes the point 
where the line is drawn in New York quite clear. In that 
case the defendant was the publisher of the magazine, 
"True Detective Mysteries". One of its stories, which 
concededly told a true story of a murder, was illustrated 
with a picture of the plaintiff, who was the mother lof 
one Blossom Martin who was the victim of the villain 
of the article in the magazine, and the article contained 
an actual picture of a courtroom scene showing the tear-
ful mother. The court said that no claim was made that 
the article which the picture illustrates was untrue, nor 
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was there any claim that the picture itself was not a 
correct representation of an actual scene during the 
trial of the villain. The sole question pres en ted was 
"·hether the defendant used the picture for purposes of 
trade, and the court stated at page 361 of 248 N.Y.S.: 
"Apparently, legitimate use of names and pic-
tures in commercial enterprises depends upon the 
purpose, Yie"·ing the matter from the standpoint 
of the reaction of the public rather than from the 
standpoint of the person who uses them. Names 
and pictures are legitimately used in connection 
'vith mere items of news, with matters of history 
of public men and events, and with matters which 
are submitted to the public in a way which invites 
public comment. Even private social affairs and 
prevailing fashions involving persons who make 
no bid for publicity are by custom regarded as 
public property where the apparent use is to con-
vey information in interest and not mere adver-
tising. 
''The use of the name and picture, in the vari-
ous ways mentioned, are generally important 
features in many commercial ventures and their 
success aided thereby. Nevertheless, from the 
standpoint of the public, the use is not for pur-
poses of trade. The distinction is well illustrated 
in the motion picture cases. Such pictures por- -
traying current events are rega.rded by the public 
as primarily educational rather than commercial, 
while a mere dramatization of the same events 
will be considered essentially commercial.'' 
The Utah statute has been construed by only one 
other court, and that in connection with the very case at 
bar. In Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 Fed. 2d 
6, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, on review 
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of a Motion to Dismiss the complaint granted by Judge 
Ritter in the U. S. District Court, held: 
''The manufacture, distribution and exhibition 
of a motion picture of the kind pleaded in the 
Amended Complaint, based primarily upon fiction 
or the imaginative, and designed primarily to 
entertain and amuse an audience desiring enter-
tainment and willing to pay therefor, does not 
constitute the publication of information and edu-
cational rna tters, or the dissemination of ·news, 
or the recounting or portrayal of actual events of 
public interest in the form of newsreels, as dis-
tinguished from commercial activities for gain or 
profit, within the intent and meaning of the 
statute." 
And that decision was, 1n effect, ratified by the 1953 
Utah legislature. It had before it House Bill 89 in which 
an attempt was made to limit the protection of the Utah 
Act to domiciliaries or those who had resided in the State 
for twenty years or more, and limit the protection as to 
deceased persons to immediate heirs. (See House Jour-
nal, 51st day, pages 17 and 18). No attempt was made 
to change the reference to "purposes of trade", and 
the en tire bill was rejected by the House by a vote of 
37-20 (House Journal, 51st day, page 18). A similar bill 
was· also tabled by the Senate. 
The trial court was undoubtedly influenced in its 
Declaratory Judgment on this phase of the problem by 
the constitutional question, elsewhere discussed, and the 
decision of this court in Paramor Theater Company v. 
Trade Commission, 95 Utah 354, 81 Pac. 2d 639, holding 
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that motion picture theaters are not within the jurisdic-
tion of the Trade Commission of Utah relating to com-
merce or trade as defined in that law. 
The meaning of words is derived from the context 
and setting in ""'hich they are used. Obviously motion 
pictures have nothing to do with the selling of trade-
marked goods, which is the subject matter covered by 
the legislation enacted to administer the Fair Trade 
.A .. ct, which has to do exclusively with abuses relating to 
the sale of merchandise at less than cost or trade-marked 
merchandise at less than the price stipulated by the 
manufacturer. 
So too, as stated by this court in Beard v. Board of 
Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 Pac. 2d 900, the use of pictures 
in schools for educational or extra-curricular purposes, 
is not trade or commerce. 
No such questions are involved in this case. The 
use here was of a commercial film in a regular theatre 
for an admission fee, to which the public was solicited. 
This court, in the Paramor Theatre case, expressly 
recognized the difference by referring to Humiston case 
in New York, the Campbell case in Minnesota, and the 
Kozy Theater case in Kentucky and said that the broader 
interpretation was given in those cases because ''the 
context seemed to require it''. This court simply held 
that, from a reading of the whole Fair Trade Act, it 
was not evident that the legislature intended it to apply 
to motion picture theaters and that in interpreting such 
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a law it should clearly appear from the enactment itself 
that an activity was covered by clear and decisive words 
or the court should not bring them in by judicial con-
struction of doubtful words. This latter salutory state-
ment could well apply to Judge Van Cott's exemption 
of the movie industry from operation of our statute in 
addition to serving as a basis for understanding the deci-
sion in that case. Neither the Paramor case nor the Beard 
case has anything to do with the principle involved in 
tbis case. Both cases have to do with interpretation of 
the words as applied to particular statutory enactments. 
In the case at bar the use of the word ''trade'' is in 
connection with a different statute, relating to a different 
subject matter, and for the purpose of correcting or pre-
venting an evil which has to do with the use of a name. 
All decided cases relating to the law of privacy and under 
the New York statute have held that the law applies to 
movies, radios, newspapers, books and magazines, within 
proper limits. 
Judge Van Cott's Paragraph No. 4 of the Declara-
tory Judgment goes beyond both the New York cases 
and the Court of Appeals decision. He holds factual or 
fictional portrayals to be without the statute. The New 
York rule has the saluto;ry purpose of avoiding sub-
stantially the constitutional question which bothered the 
lower court in its Par. No. 3 and the Court of Appeals 
in the Donahue case in the dissenting opinion. By limit-
ing the protection of the statute as did Judge Bratton, 
in the Court of Appeals (page 13 of 194 Fed. 2d 6), the 
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constitutional issue is aYoided. The interpretation of the 
lo\ver court here as to purposes of trade does the same 
thing constitutionally, but it does it by effectively exempt-
ing the motion picture industry from the Utah statute 
and giving Hollywood a carte blanche in the State of 
Utah, short only of libel, and of course libel does not 
surYive death as does the protection of the Utah statute. 
Public figures ''such as Jack Donahue'', whatever that 
means, are now fair game. Poor Mr. Binns in the ''Wreck 
of the Republic'' could be portrayed as a drunk and 
asleep at his post rather than as the hero of the rescue. 
The great pioneers of our State and its illustrious men 
and women of the remote and immediate past may be 
portrayed without any other limitation than the con-
science of the writer or producer, all for the glory and 
profit of the motion picture industry and safe from the 
restraints of the Utah statute, so long as it is a motion 
picture or any other of the other media in the same cate-
gory. Manifestly, the ruling of the trial court is a dis-
tortion of the meaning and intent of the statute. News-
reels ~ Yes. Documentaries and similar educational :films 
put out by the organizations represented by Mr. Eric 
Haight (R. 330 and 349) ~ Yes. Even though Warner 
Bros. may find such an enthusiastic ex-educator as Dr. 
Wheelwright to sound the tocsin for ''Look for the Silver 
Lining'' as the perfect instrument for education, it is 
submitted that the Utah Statute means what it says and 
that the ordinary Hollywood feature film, which obviously 
includes "Look for the Silver Lining", is not privileged 
no matter how famous its characters. And with all due 
respect to Professor Eaton, whether putting Prince 
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r 
Albert on a can is trade and portraying him in ''Victoria 
Regina" is art (R. 489) is not even a matter before this 
court. The question is whether ordinary feature com-
mercial motion pictures have an unbridled right to por-
tray in Utah figures "like Jack Donahue", factually or 
fictionally, without regard to the Utah statute. It is sub-
mitted the statute clearly says "no" and that paragraph 
4 of the Declaratory Judgment of the District Court is 
In error. 
Of course, what may be done by the movies may be 
done by television, and also the radios, the public press 
and fiction writers. If Judge Van Cott's Declaratory 
Judgment is the law in this State the statute is amended 
thereby to exclude all such activities, the bars are down, 
and the wolves of fictionalization are at large without 
restraint. 
Yes, the decision goes farther. Those agencies may 
even dig up the past as to living persons and the law of 
privacy in Utah is a thing of the past. Just when did 
the people of Utah give to the courts the power to amend 
laws~ Their duty is to interpret the law-not make it. 
The sons and daughters, and even the husbands or 
wives, of many of our illustrious forebears are still with 
us. Would they have no recourse to stop such exploita-
tion~ The statute says ''yes''. Judge Van Cott says 
''No, if it is a movie.'' If he is right it extends to every-
thing else within the same category. It is not the law. 
It is legally and morally wrong. 
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POINTS 1, 3, 19, 28 and 10 (a) 
THE TRI ... -\L COURT ERRONEOUSLY LIMITED 
PLAINTIFFS TO IN JURY TO THEIR FEELINGS 
IN THE nLA_TTER OF D.AJ\LA_GES AND ERRONE-
OUSLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION 
OF EXPLOIT_._c\.TION OF THE NAME OF JACK 
DONAHUE BY DEFENDANTS, FOR PURPOSES OF 
TR.ADE, IN THE ST_A_TE OF UTAH AS AN ISSUE 
TO BE TRIED. 
This point appeared first in the case when plaintiffs, 
by timely application, requested permission to file an 
amendment to their complaint as follows: 
'' 13. That prior to the death of said Jack 
Donahue and for many years prior thereto said 
Jack Donahue used his name in the entertainment 
and literary field throughout the United States, 
including the State of Utah, and acquired a reeog-
nized standing therein and aequired great value 
in said name as an entertainer and author; and 
that said name of Jack Donahue was extensively 
advertised and brought to public notice in con-
nection with entertainment, dancing and as an 
author. That said defendants, by their unlawfuh 
and unauthorized use of said name for trade and 
commercial purposes have exploited and used 
said name for their financial gain to the extent of 
thousands of dollars and to the damage of plain-
tiffs in the sum of One Hundred Thousand Dol-
lars.'' 
The trial court denied this request upon the ground 
that it was not a proper issue to be considered (R. 70). 
In its instructions to the jury the court so stated (R. 
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555) ; and it refused to issue an injunction against de-
fendants from exploiting and using the name in Utah 
for purposes of trade. In all of these respects the trial 
court was in error. 
This issue has been passed on in a number of cases 
arising under the law of privacy without the aid of a 
statute and under the New York statute, and in this case 
by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit. 
The trial court refused to follow those cases. 
Our statute creates the right on the part of heirs to 
sue for damages and for an injunction. It cannot be 
denied that the legislature had the power to create such 
a cause of action in the heirs. 
Both by statute in this State and under the common 
law relating to privacy forbidding the use of an indi-
vidual's name for advertising or trade purposes, the 
value of the name which is commercialized and exploited 
for trade purposes should be a material issue to be con-
sidered by the jury in the assessment of damages and 
for the court in its consideration of the request for in-
junctive relief. 
The difficulty with the trial court \Yas that it could 
see only one phase of the problem-injury to f celings. 
It could not see the broader phase of exploitation of the 
name for purposes of trade in addition to or asidP from 
injury to feelings. It could not see that a party has the 
right to stop his name or the name of the decedent from 
being exploited for trade purposes regardless of 'vhether 
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it hurts his feelings. It could not see that the statute 
was intended to stop the use of the name for trade pur-
poses \vhether it damages him or not and regardless of 
the nature of the damage. The use of the name for trade 
purposes \Yithout permission is the wrong that the statute 
says should be prohibited and penalized. 
The good name of an individual is often his most 
valued possession. It is true with most people. To have 
it commercialized without his permission may be not only 
Yery hurtful to the feelings, but in the case of profes-
sional people may destroy the very thing that they have 
made into a valuable asset. 
An individual may spend a lifetime at work, train-
ing and good effort in creating the value which may be 
attached to his name. Under the trial court's ruling in 
this case this may be taken by another and exploited for 
gain so long as you do not injure his feelings-in other 
words, so long as it is complimentary. Such was not the 
purpose of the statute. 
Let us :first see if our understanding of the purpose 
of the statute is correct. 
41 Am. Juris, 933, Section 10 : 
''Statutes have been enacted in some states 
making it a misdemeanor to use, for purposes of 
advertising or trade, the name, portrait, or pic-
ture of a person without his consent, and giving 
a person whose name, portrait, or picture is so 
used a right of action for damages or for an in-
junction. Such statutes have been held to be con-
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stitutional. This type of statute is directed 
against the commercial exploitation of one's per-
sonality. It does not prohibit every use of the 
name or likeness of a person. In determining 
\Vhether a name or likeness is used primarily for 
advertising or trade, within the meaning of a 
statute, the court may consider the circumstances 
and the extent, degree, or character of the use. 
The words 'picture' and 'portrait', as used in 
such statutes, would apparently include any rep-
resentation, whether by photograph, painting, or 
sculpture. It has been said that such a statute is 
in part penal, and that the strictness of its con-
struction should be governed accordingly. But 
it has also been suggested that the construction 
should aid the remedial aspects and purposes of 
the statute.'' 
The New York courts have said that the statute was 
directed ''against the commercial exploitation of one's 
personality", and had its "roots in dissatisfaction with 
what was felt to be an archaic rule of law". 
The court was referring, of course, to the majority 
opinion in the case of Roberson vs. Rochester Folding 
Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, which caused the 
New York Legislature at its next session to enact the 
statute. 
The purpose of the New York statute was also con-
sidered in the case of Rhodes vs. Sperry & H. Co., 193 
N. Y. 223, attacking the constitutionality of the statute, 
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 220 U. S. 502, 55 L. Ed. 561. It was there stated 
in the following language : 
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"The power of the legislature in the absence 
of any constitutional restriction to declare that a 
particular act shall constitute a crime or be 
actionable as a tort cannot be questioned, where 
the right established or recognized and sought to 
be protected is based upon an ethical sanction. 
Such is the character of the right of privacy pre-
serYed by legislation protecting persons against 
the unauthorized use of their names or portraits 
in the form of advertisements or trade notices. 
It is a recognition by the lawmaking power of 
the Yery general sentiment which prevailed 
throughout the community against permitting ad-
vertisers to promote the sale of their wares by this 
method, regardless of the wishes of the persons 
thereby affected. There was a natural and wide-
spread feeling that such use of their names and 
portraits in the absence of consent was indefens-
ible in morals and ought to be prevented by law. 
Hence, the enactment of this statute.'' 
See also Gardella vs. Log Cabin Products, 89 Fed. 
2d 891. 
Neyla;nd vs. Home Pattern Co., 65 Fed. 2d 363. 
Many of the early cases in England and in the United 
States, before publication of the famous article by War~ 
ren and Brandeis in the Harvard Law Review ( 4 H.L.R. 
192) and before any statutes were enacted, had afforded 
some relief on the theory that names and pictures are a 
personal or property right of the individual. Many of 
the modern cases have recognized that principle without 
the aid of a statute. With the statute there should be 
no doubt. 
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In another New York case, the famous Grand Opera . 
star, Mary Garden, gave her written consent, without 
consideration (which is hard to understand in these days) 
to the use of her name in connection with the sale of a 
certain brand of perfume. She then changed her mind 
and revoked the license or permit. She sued to enjoin 
the use and the New York Court, in Garden vs. Par-
fumerie Rigaud, 271 N. Y. S. 187, issued the injunction, 
say1ng: 
"Regardless of plaintiff's reason for her re-
fusal to continue permission to use her name, and 
even admitting that her reason is ulterior and 
mercenary, it cannot be denied that her name and 
her portrait a.re her own and during life solely at 
her disposal.'' 
This was under the New York statute. Similar rights 
are given to the immediate heirs of deceased persons 
under out statute; otherwise the statutes are the same. 
The Tenth Circuit Court in its decision in this case 
announced that the purpose of the Utah statute is to 
prohibit exploitation of the name by another. 
The following cases recognized those principles 
without a specific statute: 
Hinish v. Meier & Frank Company, Inc., 166 Ore. 
482, 113 Pac. 2d 438, 138 A. L. R. 1 (See an-
notation page 22). 
Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. 
Eq. 136; 67 A. 392. 
Pa.vesich v. N e'v England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
122 Ga. 190; 50 S. E. 68. 
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Flake "'· Greensboro N e"~s Co., 212 N. C. 780; 195 
S.E. 55. 
Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652; 134 S. W. 
1076. 
We take the liberty of quoting from the last case 
above as follows : 
''Property is not necessarily a taxable thing 
any more than it is always a tangible thing. It 
may consist of things incorporeal, and things in-
corporeal may consist of rights common in every 
man. * * * If a man has a right to his own image 
as made to appear by his picture, it cannot be 
appropriated by another against his consent. It 
must strike the most obtuse that a claim of ex-
clusive right to one's picture is a just claim. * * * 
One may have peculiarity of appearance, and if 
it is to be made a matter of merchandise, why 
should it not be for his benefit~ It is a right which 
he may wish to exercise for his own profit, and 
why may he not restrain another who is using it 
for gain~ If there is value in it, sufficient to 
excite the cupidity of another, why is it not the 
property of him who gives it the value and from 
whom the value springs~ 
* * * * * 
''We therefore conclude that one has an ex-
clusive right to his picture, on the score of its 
being a property right of material profit. We 
also consider it to be a property right of value, 
in that it is one of the modes of securing to a 
person the enjoyment of life and the exercise of 
liberty, and that novelty of the claim is no objec-
tion to relief. If this right is, in either respect, 
invaded, he may have his remedy, either by re-
straint in equity or damages in any action at law. 
If there are special damages, they may be stated 
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and recovered; but such character of damage is 
not necessary to the action, since general damages 
may be recovered without a showing of specific 
loss; and if the element of malice appears, as that 
term is known to the law, exemplary damages 
may be recovered.'' 
In the case of Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co. from 
State of Oregon, cited above, Justice Lusk has given a 
very learned review of the law of privacy as it has been 
developed since the Warren and Brandeis article started 
the trend of modern thought on the subject. We quote 
the following, which seems particularly applicable to 
the reasoning which should be influential in interpreting 
the end sought to be accomplished by the statute: 
''As to names, it is the general rule (although, 
as we have observed, there is authority to the 
contrary) that a person has no such exclusive 
right to the use of his own name as to prevent the 
assumption of its use by another. But it is dif-
ferent when one's own name is used in such a way 
as to amount to unfair competition. In connection 
with questions of that kind, a man's name is said 
to be his O"\Vn property. * * * 
''By analogy to this principle, there ought to 
be little difficulty today in deciding a question 
such as that involved in the Roberson case in 
favor of the one asserting the exclusive right to 
the use of his own picture as against appropria-
tion by another for the purpose of advertising his 
wares; for selling one's likeness to be so used is 
today a business in itself. Faces, some faces, at 
any rate, have a recognized commercial value. The 
face of the plaintiff in the Roberson case must 
have had such value, else the defendants would 
not have gone to the trouble and expense of repro-
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dueing and distributing broadcast her likeness. 
If it 'vas of value to the defendants, why not to 
her, even though :she preferred not to capitalize 
upon itJ? 
''Our consideration of the subject leads us to 
the conclusion that natural justice and the needs 
of the society in 'vhich we live should prevail over 
objections based upon the novelty of the asserted 
cause of action. It is time that fictions be aban-
doned and the real character of the injury be 
frankly avowed. When Brandeis and Warren 
wrote in 1890, it 'vas the unseemly intrusions of 
a portion of the press into the privacy of the 
home that was emphasized as the main source of 
evil ; since then motion pictures and the radio 
have -been perfected and have taken their places 
among our great industries, while instantaneous 
photography today accomplishes miracles scarcely 
dreamed of fifty years ago. Thus, the potentiali-
ties for this character of wrong are now greatly 
multiplied. A decision against the right of pri-
vacy would be nothing less than an invitation to 
those so inclined who control these instrumentali-
ties of communication, information and education, 
to put them to base uses, with complete immunity, 
and without regard to the hurt done to the sensi-
bilities of individuals whose private affairs might 
be exploited, "\vhether out of malice or for selfish 
purposes.'' 
The Oregon Court 1n the above case also quoted 
with approval the following from Edison v. Edison Poly-
form & Mfg. Co., supra: 
" 'If a man's name be his own property, as no 
less an authority than the United States Supreme 
Court says it is (Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 
139 lJ. S. (540) 542, 11 S. Ct. 625, 35 L. Ed. 247) 
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it is difficult to understand why the peculiar cast 
of one's features is not also one's property, and 
why its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not 
belong to its owner, rather than to the person 
seeking to make an unauthorized use of it.' " 
In the case of Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 
2nd 243, 168 A. L. R. 430 (1944) the Supreme Court of 
Florida adopted the following definition of the law of 
privacy: 
'' 'The following is offered, by the present 
writer, as a fairly comprehensive definition of 
what constitutes an actionable invasion of the 
right of privacy :-The unwarranted appropria-
tion or exploitation of one's personality, the pub-
licizing of one's private affairs with which the 
public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful 
intrusion into one's private activities, in such 
manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, 
shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary 
sensibilities.' '' 
State v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86; 229 Pac. 317 : 
"Nothing so exclusively belongs to a man or 
is so personal and valuable to him as his name. 
His reputation and the character he has built up 
are inseparably connected with it. Others can 
have no right to use it without his express consent, 
and he has a right to go into any court at any 
time to enjoin or prohibit any unautho'rized use 
of it. Nor is it necessary that it be alleged or 
proved that such unauthorized use will damage 
him. This the law will presume. '' 
K unz u. Allen, 102 Kan. 883; 172 Pae. 532. 
Hanna Mfg. Co. v. 1/illerich & Bradsby Co., 
78 Fed 2d 763, 101 A. L. R. 484. 
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By enactment of the statute, Utah adopted as the 
la"rs of Utah those basic principles. 
The Utah statute is not limited to injured feelings, 
although they are included within the statute. The 
statute is much broader than the law of privacy, if this 
term is restricted to injured feelings alone. It precludes, 
prohibits and makes criminal and actionable as a basis 
for damages the exploitation for profit or trade pur-
poses in Utah of the name, picture or portrait of an in-
dividual. It makes the private life, reputation, name, 
picture or portrait of an individual a right or interest 
which may not be invaded, exploited or capitalized by 
others without written consent, as announced in the 
above cases. 
The Utah statute states that plaintiff may recover 
for "any injuries" that may result from the violation 
thereof. Clearly, on the face of this statute there is 
nothing which limits damages to those arising in a par-
ticular way; to the contrary, the express statement is 
that recovery can be allowed for any damages which 
plaintiff can show and prove. It may well be that in a 
particular case one type of damage would be incompat-
ible with another (see discussion in 28 Harvard Law 
Review 889); it may be that certain types of damage can 
be recoverable under another legal ground as well (e.g. 
libel, Peek v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185; Munden v. Har-
ris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 662; 134 S. W. 1076, 1080); but 
this does not justify an arbitrary declaration that what 
is probably the most usual ground for recovery is exclu-
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sive and that other grounds are without the statute-i.e., 
compensation for the commercial use of plaintiff's name. 
It has been said that the doctrine of privacy covers 
three different types of injuries ( 31 Texas Law Rev. 82; 
28 H. L. R. 689). Among these appear both the injury 
to one's feelings, and exploitation for a commercial pur-
pose of a person's name {31 Texas Law Rev. 82), or 
more succinctly, an interest in property (28 H. L. R. 689). 
The latter may be involved where the person exploited 
had treated his name as having pecuniary value, par-
ticularly if this was the case by virtue of his business 
or profession, as in the case of Donahue. 
Thus, Colt, J., stated: 
''Independently of the question of contract I 
believe the law to be that a private individual has 
a right to be protected in the representation of 
his portrait in any form; that this is a property as 
well as a personal right; and that it belongs to 
the same class of rights which forbids the repro-
duction of a private manuscript or painting or 
the publication of private letters or a lecture de-
livered by a teacher to his class, or the revelation 
of the contents of a merchant's books by a clerk 
... '' Corliss v. Walker, 64 F. 280. (Emphasis 
added) 
As was stated in the Texas Law Review: 
''Where the plaintiff is a public personage and 
his name or picture is appropriated for an adver-
tisement, the measure of damages should be its 
reasonable value for advertising purposes. Where 
a person's history is exploited, as in the instant 
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case, the damages should be the value of that 
history for the purpose in 'vhich it was employed 
... And, of course, in addition to such damages, 
the plaintiff should also be allowed to recover 
for any humiliation or mental suffering caused 
by the defendant ... " (31 Texas Law Rev. 82) 
It has been urged that in the case of an action by a 
living person that the right of property and of feelings 
are not compatible and cannot be jointly claimed, (28 
H. L. R. 689) it being felt that a property right presup-
poses prior publicity which under circumstances may 
constitute a waiver of any action for injured feelings. 
It is submitted that the better view is that the two 
can co-exist and that it is a question of degree. As the 
Tenth Circuit has stated in this case: 
''By becoming a public figure one may relin-
quish in part right of privacy which would be his 
under other circumstances ... The right may be 
waived completely or only in part. It may be 
waived for one purpose, and still be asserted for 
another. But the existence of the waiver carries 
with it the right to invade the right of privacy of 
the individual only to the extent legitimately 
necessary and proper in dealing with the matter 
which gave rise to the waiver. The question 
whether a person is a public figure and therefore 
has waived in part his right of privacy may rest 
upon various and variable facts and circumstan-
ces. And no rule of thumb has been evolved for 
its easy solution in all cases." (Donahue v. War-
ner Bros. Pictures, 194 Fed. 2d at 12-13) 
However, such questions of fact, varying with every 
case, would be pertinent only in a case where waiver is 
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shown for the particular purpose as hereafter discussed 
under another heading. Even those who urge an essen-
tial incompatibility admit that "Whether the interest, 
and consequently the right, is one of substance or of 
personality must be considered from the standpoint of 
the individual injured." (28 H. L. R. 689) As such the 
presence of a right of property or of personality can 
only be determined when all of the facts are in. There 
is no dispute that right of property cam,, in some cases, 
and in this case did, exist. 
Utah's statute is sufficiently unique to avoid these 
problems, for it greatly extends the scope of even similar 
statutes to allow recovery by the immediate heirs of a 
deceased person. This is the case before us. 
The property right is created by the activities of 
the decedent during his lifetime. It results wholly from 
his own actions, and has no relation to the feelings of 
his heirs. This property right may be made more con-
crete, and easier of financial estimate, as it was in this 
case, in plaintiffs' prof erred amendment to their com-
plaint where they allege damages for inability to market 
a certain manuscript, but the fact remains that plain-
tiffs are suing on a value the right to which is created 
by statute. 
Thus, in cases such as this where the heirs are bring-
ing the action, rights of personality and property are 
not exclusive, for they do not stem from the same source. 
Jack Donahue could not have waived damages for injury 
to his ·heirs' feelings if he had wished. 
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It is thus submitted that the trial court erred in 
refusing to allow plaintiffs to sue for injury to their 
right of property. 
The mistake that the trial court made was in mis-
applying one feature of the law of privacy as announced 
by some courts, where a similar statute was not involved, 
to this case. The statute should h'ave been recognized as 
an adoption by Utah of the broader view of the right 
and given full application in accordance with its langu-
age. This is an action imposing a tort liability for 
violation of the terms of the statute, which defendants 
admittedly did. 
The portion of the Utah statute banning use by 
others of the name, portrait or picture of another for 
advertising or trade purposes is to be found in the 
statutes of only two other states, New York and Virginia. 
We gain some assistance from New York decisions; also 
from the basic underlying principles that the statute 
obviously intended to adopt the principles announced in 
the foregoing cases that one may not reap the financial 
harvest of another's life, name and reputation, without 
written permission so to do. 
Within the State of Utah an individual's name, por-
trait and picture are by statute made a right which is 
his to hold and have during his lifetime and to leave to 
his heirs when he dies. That it is a valuable right is 
plainly evident from the facts )n the instant case. Jack 
Donahue was a famous dancer, actor and entertainer. 
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He was, during his lifetime, the foremost in his profes-
sion-akin to present-day celebrities. His fame and 
popularity attracted the public to his performances. The 
same may be said of Marilyn Miller, with whom he 
teamed in some of his productions. Warner Brothers 
now seek, for their own enrichment, and to the exclusion 
of his heirs, to gain the benefit of that reputation and 
popularity by reenacting scenes from some of the plays 
in which he appeared, including some with Miss Miller, 
and by :fictionally portraying what they regard as inci-
dents in his life, under his own name. Such exploitation 
and fictional misrepresentation of an individual's life 
for trade or advertising (commercial) purposes, without 
permission so to do, is the thing that the statute is in-
tended to stop and to make actionable in damages. 
The proper interpretation of the Utah statute makes 
injury to feelings or personal distress from undesired 
publicity one, but only one, element in the damage action. 
The other, and more far reaching damage, is the financial 
loss from unauthorized and unpermitted exploitation 
and commercialization in Utah of the name, picture or 
portrait which deprives the individual or his heirs of 
the :financial value of the name and reputation which he 
has built up at great effort and expense and enables an-
other to reap the financial harvest of the efforts and 
reputation of others. This commercialization occurred 
in Utah. 
It was by failure of the trial court to recognize this 
broader view of the Utah statute that it '\\ras led to make 
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its erroneous ruling in this case. Exploitation and com-
mercialization of the name of Jack Donahue within the 
State of Utah for financial gain and profit within the 
State of Utah, without permission of plaintiffs, IS an 
accepted and admitted fact in this case. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Brown 
Chemical Co. vs. Mayer, 139 U.S. 540, 35 L. Ed. 247, says: 
''A man's name is his own property arnd he has the sam.e 
right to its ~tSe and enjoyment as he has to that of amy 
other species of property.'' 
In Uproar vs. National Broadcasting Co., 81 Fed. 
2d 373, affirming the same case in 8 Fed Supp. 358, the 
name was recognized as a property right which could 
be licensed out and the right to use of which could be 
assigned. 
Dean Prosser, in his work on Torts, at page 1056 
has the following to say on this subject: 
''The greater number of privacy cases, how-
ever, have involved the appropriation of some ele-
ment of the plaintiff's personality for a commer-
cial use. The typical case is that of the unauthor-
ized use of his picture in the defendant's adver-
tising. Although the protection of his personal 
feelings is still highly important in such a case, 
the right invaded has also a commercial value. It 
is perhaps futile to argue "\vhether it is to be called 
a 'property' right on the ground that if the law 
will protect it the defendant will be compelled to 
pay the plaintiff for the privilege of using the 
picture, since that might be true of any other 
protected right. There is at least a commercial 
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benefit to the defendant through the appropria-
. tion of an exclusive asset of the plaintiff. The 
mere use of a name similar to that of the planiti:ff 
is probably never actionable in itself, since in the 
absence of a statute a person may be given or 
assume any name he likes; but where the name 
is tied up and identified with other aspects of his 
personality, such as his reputation in business, or 
incidents in his life, and its use amounts to an 
appropriation of such values, recovery frequently 
has been permitted. '' 
The trial court adopted the same view as was taken 
by the majority opinion in the Roberson case, which was 
repudiated by the New York Legislature·by adoption of 
the statute and of which the American Law Journal said 
in Vol. 36, page 636 : 
''The decision under review shocks and wounds 
the ordinary sense of justice of mankind. We have 
heard it alluded to only by terms of regret." 
It is no wonder the New York Legislature acted as 
soon as it could. 
\Ve respectfully submit that the trial court adopted 
an archaic rule of law not the view that should recognize 
the vast value of a name which our statute \\·as intended 
to protect against use and exploitation by others \vithout 
written consent. 
That the name had a value i'or purpoNes of exploi-
tation by defendants is manifest from its selP('tion for 
use. Plaintiffs did not offer their t~vidence as to the 
value of the name bee a use the trial court had already, 
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by refusing permission to a1nend the complaint, denied 
them that right. By combining the name of the deceased 
star with the impersonation by a living star, the defend-
ants received double value, one for v.rhich they paid (the 
living star) and one which they received gratis (the 
deceased star) if the trial court's view of the la.w is 
adhered to in this case. 
We may even go farther and say that the one star 
need not be deceased if the trial court's view is correct. 
The statute makes no difference between the living and 
the dead excepting as to who has the right to the cause 
of action. If, under our law, they can use the name of 
the deceased Jack Donahue, they can do the same with 
any living individual. This flies in the very teeth of our 
statute and the common law right of name and privacy. 
When our lawmakers said that the name of living 
and deceased individuals could not be used for adver-
tising or trade purposes without the consent of the indi-
vidual if living or of his heirs or personal representatives 
if deceased, without their consent, they intended to 
protect all non-consenting individuals not only from 
adverse and humiliating injury to their feelings and sen-
sibilities by reason of things that hurt inwardly, but 
also to secure to them the values which have been created 
by making the name a valuable asset, however it be con-
sidered. 
Under the decided cases there seems little doubt 
that the name of an individual is a valuable right, the 
value of which he creates through his activities. He may 
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protect it against commercial exploitation by others, or 
he may by license, contract or other means, permit others 
to make use of it. It is his to have and to hold or to do 
with as he pleases. The fact remains that it is a property 
right of his, and his only. True he cannot stop others 
from having the same or a similar name. The only ques-
tion is as to the nature of the right and whether it is 
protected by the statute conferring the cause of action 
on the heirs. 
The effect of the trial court's ruling in this case is to 
emasculate, amend and annul the statute and adopt the 
law of the majority opinion in the Roberson case which 
the statute was enacted to repudiate. All authorities who 
have considered the subject agree that no court would 
now follow the law that was announced in the majority 
opinion in the Roberson case, but the trial court did. It 
is universally condemned as unsound, regardless of 
statute. Our State repudiated it by legislative enactment. 
We have high regard for the rights of our citizens, both 
great and small. It would be most unfortunate if by 
judicial legislation the door were opened to commercial 
exploitation of the names, pictures, or portraits of 
church, civic, political and pioneer leaders whose pic-
turesque and eventful lives are so inviting for box office 
appeal and commercial exploitation, and particularly so 
if fictionalized with the magic touch of the imagination 
of the scenario writer. They could really dra'v the 
throngs if this court permits itself to say that this statute 
does not mean what it says. It is a matter of the most 
serious concern. 
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POINTS 10 (e) (f) and 27. 
THE FACT THAT JACK DONAHUE WAS A 
DECEASED PUBLIC ENTERTAINER DID NOT 
JUSTIFY DEFENDANTS IN USING HIS NAME 
FOR PURPOSES OF TRADE IN UTAH IN VIOLA-
TION OF THE STATUTE, PARTICULARLY BY 
FICTIONALIZING HIS LIFE. 
The trial court set forth the principles for which 
we contend in its instructions No. 5 and 6 as follows : 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
"You are instructed that by the laws of the 
State of Utah it is unlawful for any person to use 
for purposes of trade or for advertising purposes 
the name, portrait or picture of any. person, if 
living, without first having obtained the written 
consent of such person, or if such person is dead, 
without having obtained the written consent of 
the heirs or personal representatives of the de-
ceased person. 
"It is further a part of the laws of the State 
of Utah that the heirs or personal representatives 
of any deceased person, whose name, portrait or 
picture is used within the State of Utah for ad-
vertising purposes or for purposes of trade, with-
out the written consent first having been obtained 
as above set forth may maintain an action against 
such person or persons so using the name, picture 
or portrait to recover damages for any injuries 
sustained by reason of such use, and, if the de-
fendant or defendants shall have knowingly used 
such person's name, portrait or picture in such 
unlawful manner, exemplary or punitive damages 
may be awarded in addition to the actual damages. 
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"You are further instructed that in this case, 
it is undisputed in the evidence that the motion 
picture, 'Look for the Silver Lining', was exhi-
bited in the State of Utah; that the name Jack 
Donahue was used as the name of the principal 
male actor therein; that Jack Donahue was the 
husband of the plaintiff Alice Donahue and the 
father of the other named plaintiffs. Such being 
the case, you are instructed that the plaintiffs are 
the heirs of Jack Donahue and are entitled to 
institute this action.'' 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
"The Utah statute does not undertake to re-
strict or forbid the publication of matters essen-
tially educational or informative or strictly bio-
graphical in character, and is not to be so con-
strued. It does, however, forbid the appropria-
tion of the name, picture or representation of the 
personality of an individual for commercial pur-
poses, or for purposes of trade, and the fact that 
Jack Donahue was a public figure to the extent 
and in the way indicated, would not give the de-
fendants the right to dramatize his life in a motion 
picture based primarily upon fiction and the 
imaginative. You should understand that the fact 
that some facts of his life are correctly portrayed 
does not prevent your determining that on the 
whole the motion picture is based primarily upon 
fiction and the imaginative and that such facts as 
are correctly portrayed are so interwoven with 
fiction as to present a distorted and untrue fic-
tional result as a 'vhole. 
"If, therefore, you shall find that the motion 
picture is based essentially upon fiction or the 
imaginative and designed primarily to entertain 
and amuse an audienee desiring entertainment, 
then your Yerdict should be for plaintiffs and you 
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should proceed to assess the damages in accord-
ance with the instructions relating thereto." 
Had the matter so remained the jury would have 
had some idea. as to the applicable law. However, the 
trial court did not so leave the matter. It then proceeded 
to confuse the issue by giving contradictory instructions 
on the subject matter of the effect of fictionalization as 
applied to public figures, and by setting forth in instruc-
tion No. 13, in effect, that the jury might take into 
account the extent, if any, that plaintiffs had waived 
their rights and the extent to which J a.ck Donahue had 
waived their rights, during his lifetime, by becoming a 
public figure. Even these contradictory pronouncements 
were thrown overboard by the trial court in its Declara-
tory Judgment to the effect that the Utah statute does 
not apply at all to deceased public figures so far as the 
movie industry is concerned. 
Let us see if we can clarify the problem and arrive 
at a correct solution. 
Defendants contend that Jack Donahue was a de-
ceased public figure and that by becoming a public figure 
he had relinquished to the public, i~cluding defendants, 
his rights to be immune from publicity and exploitation 
for the purposes complained of in this case. The trial 
court adopted this view in its Declaratory Judgment and 
in effect so stated in its Instruction No. 13. 
Under the common law of privacy a public figure 
undoubtedly waives his rights as to certain types of 
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publicity and public comment. But the waiver IS not 
unlimited and absolute for all purposes. Even public 
figures, by becoming such, do not open the door to com-
mercial exploitation of their names, pictures and por-
traits. No one knows that better than these defendants. 
They are dealing continuously with public figures in the 
entertainment world. If by becoming famous the door 
were opened to commercial exploitation of the name, 
picture or portrait of all famous individuals without 
their consent, famous people would by their own popu-
larity destroy the values they create. The door is opened 
only as to proper comment, discussion and consideration 
of the activities they make public. Opening the door for 
one purpose does not open the door for all purposes. 
Our statute does not say by express provision or by 
implication that public individuals are excluded from 
the protection against commercial exploitation by others 
which it affords. Use for purposes of trade or commer-
cial exploitation is the offense. 
The trial court correctly stated one phase of the 
law on this subject in its Instruction No. 7 to the jury 
in the following language: 
"You are instructed that in this case the 
truthfulness or verity of the facts or incidents 
depicted in the picture as having occurred during 
the lifetime of Jack Donahue is no defense to this 
action. The Utah statute involved in this case 
prohibits use of the name, picture or portrait of 
a deceased person for purposes of trade or adver-
tising without the written consent of his heirs. 
The purpose of the statute was to prohibit the 
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exploitation for purposes of trade the name, pic-
ture, professional standing, or reputation of an 
individual without written consent of the person, 
or his heirs if deceased.'' 
This 'vas fine; but the trial court proceeded to con-
tradict itself in that regard by stating in its instructions 
No. 2 and 3 that it was essential to plaintiffs' cause of 
action that they establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the motion picture was essentially fictional 
or imaginative, thereby in effect stating that if it were 
truthful it would be 01(, even though it be for commercial 
exploitation or purposes of trade. The trial court in in-
struction No. 2 said that if plaintiffs did not prove that 
the picture was fictional and imaginative defendants 
would be entitled to recover. 
This is exactly the opposite of what the trial court 
told the jury. He said in instruction No.7 that the truth 
(factual) was no defense. He said in instructions No. 2 
and 3 that unless it was fictional we could not recover. 
Now he says in the Declaratory Judgment that it doesn't 
make any difference whether it was factual or fictional. 
Either one, we have no cause of action. Having no clear 
idea of the law, the trial court first stated the law cor-
rectly, then undid it, and then misstated the law com-
pletely in its Declaratory Judgment. It is no wonder 
the jury was confused when the court was not clear in 
pronouncing the applicable law. 
The court there says in so many words that in order 
for the film to come within the protection of the statutb 
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it must be :fictional or imaginative. Such is not the law. 
Commercial exploitation of the name, picture or portrait 
of another is unlawful regardless of the verity or truth-
fulness. 
If it was necessary for plaintiffs to prove fictionali-
zation in order to recover as stated in instructions No. 
2 and 3, then truthful depiction for commercial purposes 
would be a. defense. The two instructions are contradic-
tory and destructive of each other. 
The court says in instruction No. 3 that if the pic-
ture is essentially educational or informative that it is 
protected by the con.stitutional guarantees with reference 
to freedom of speech and press; and clearly implies in 
that instruction that unless it is fictional or imaginative 
it is so protected. 
Neither the State nor Federal Constitution says any 
such thing. Neither constitution is involved in this case, 
as herein elsewhere discussed. Under those provisions 
of the Constitutions the press may disseminate the news 
and freemen may speak their minds and opinions with 
reference to public individuals and public questions and 
they may provide their own entertainment without prior 
censorship; but this does not mean that they may not be 
held liable for invasion of the rights of others if they 
go beyond that protection. Newspapers and motion pic-
tures have no more right to violate the law or privacy 
or exploit the name, pi(·ture or portrait of au individual 
for commercial purposes than any other citizen. 
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The uncontradicted evidence showed that it was just 
as fictional as the amended complaint alleged and as ¥rs. 
Donahue and her daughters testified. No one testified 
to the contrary. The testimony of the expert witnesses 
went only to an attempted justification of fictionalization 
on artistic, educational and biographical grounds. They 
did not deny the fictionalization, did not deny its extent 
as given by Mrs. Donahue and as alleged in the amended 
complaint. Defendants admitted it in the allegations of 
their counterclaim for a. declaratory judgment. They 
say it ''ras in part fictional, but the only truthful part 
was as stated in the amended complaint, viz., that he 
was a famous dancer, comedian, entertainer and author; 
he did play with Marilyn Miller in two shows, "Sonny" 
and "Rosalie", and he was the foremost actor of his 
type. The rest was fictional, just as the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated would constitute a cause of 
action under the statute. 
In its instructions to the jury the trial court in 
effect left it to the jury to decide whether the picture 
was educational or informative (biographical) and said 
that if it was plaintiffs could not recover. This was not 
a jury question in this case. The use to which the name 
was put was the question, and on this issue the fact was 
undisputed. In its Declaratory Judgment the trial court 
took a different view of the law. There is complete con-
flict between the two pronouncements of the trial court 
on this subject. The trial court was in error on both 
pronouncements. On the undisputed facts it should have 
been a law question for the court. If the law was as 
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announced by the court in its Declaratory Judgment it 
should have granted the motion of defendants for a 
dismissal of the case at the close of plaintiffs' evidence. 
If it was not, it should have directed a verdict for plain-
tiffs, leaving only the matter of damages to the jury. 
The evidence of defendants added nothing to the facts 
of the case. It was directed entirely to opinion and 
argument as to the use to which the film might be made. 
The facts were undisputed. The nature of the film, the 
purpose and nature of the exhibitions were not contra-
dicted or varied by the opinion evidence, which will be 
discussed elsewhere herein. 
No one from Warner Brothers, either the company 
that made it or the company that exhibited it, testified 
in this case. No one testified that it was created or 
exhibited as a biography, which it was not, or as a news-
reel, or for educational purposes. It was a commercial 
film exhibited for what it would bring as a box office 
attraction for the financial gain of the maker, distributor 
and exhibitors. 
The most that can be said for the opinion evidence 
of the so-called experts is that it is a film that could be 
used to show to students for their entertainment or to 
show them fancy dance steps or dramatic appeal; that 
it was a showing of how music and dramatic art were 
produced by great stars of the 1920's and 1930's; and 
that it did deal with what was purported to be the doings 
of two deceased stars, fictionalized to increase the appeal. 
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This is not what the freedom of press and speech 
provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions have 
exeluded from the legislative power of enactment. 
News events, whether contained in newspapers, 
newsreels put out by the motion picture industry or 
pictorial magazines are protected. 
True biographies of famous individuals, living and 
deceased, are protected. 
Educational matter prepared and distributed for 
use in educational institutions for purposes of instruc-
tion may be protected. We will not argue the point. No 
such use is involved here. 
The fact that someone in the process of creating or 
distributing such material for those purposes may make 
or hope to make financial gain is beside the point. It is 
the nature of the product and the purpose of its use that 
determines the protection to which it is entitled. 
The decided cases leave no doubt as to where the 
protection ends and liability commences. The case at 
bar, on the undisputed facts, is in the liability group. 
Webster defines a biography as the written history 
of the life of a person. 
Aside from the fact that Jack Donahue was a famous 
dancer and actor and he did appear with Marilyn Miller 
in two shows, ' ' Sonny'' and ''Rosalie'', the balance of 
the movie, ''Look for the Silver Lining'' depicting the 
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life of Jack Donahue was wholly fictional and untrue 
both as to fact and character of person. Even the scenes 
purportedly taken from those shows were not accurately 
portrayed and the impersonation of Jack Donahue by 
the present film star, Ray Bolger, was exactly the oppo-
site from Jack Donahue's personality. 
It was just about as much a biography as though 
they were to make a movie called ''The Great Pioneer'' 
and have someone therein portray the part of Brigham 
Young but having him act like Jim Bridger or some of 
the other mountain men. If they had done that while 
Brigham Young was alive or while some of his sons or 
daughters were alive, would this court, with this statute 
on the books, have said that it was a biographical play 
because it was a true depiction of life in the wide open 
spaces at that time~ That is what the trial court said 
in this case, and that is the full import of what the so-
called experts said. No doubt such a play or movie 
would have had great box office appeal, particularly 
outside of Utah, and they probably could have had plenty 
of educators and literary critics available to testify that 
it was fit for students to see in their leizure time ; and 
it probably would have had the approval of some societies 
and scholars of western history. They could well have 
said with experts in this case, ''The fictionalizing didn't 
hurt it. There was an accurate depiction of life among 
the Pioneers and the students would have seen therein 
what the professors call 'dramatic effect', so that they 
could learn how to ere ate 'mass appeal'.'' 
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The cases say that fictionalization to this extent 
creates liability and finds no justification in the law. 
In Binns vs. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y.S. 
51, 103 N.E. 1108, 1110 L. R. A. 1915 C 839, the New York 
Court said: 
''The series of pictures were not true pictures 
of a current event but mainly a product of the 
imagination, based, however, largely upon such 
information relating to an actual occurrence as 
could readily be obtained. * * * The use of the 
name and picture of the plaintiff by the defendant 
in the picture films, and pursuant to leases .and 
agreements with the defendant in the moving pic-
ture shows, was commercial. Such use was in the 
language of the opinion in the Roberson case 'for 
his (its) own selfish purposes'.'' 
The court further said : 
''It is not designed to instruct or educate those 
who saw it. The defendant used the plaintiff's 
alleged picture to amuse those who paid to be 
entertained. If the use of the plaintiff's name and 
picture as shown in this case is not within the 
terms of the statute, then the picture of an in-
dividual could be similarly made and exhibited 
for the purpose of showing his peculiarities as of 
dress and walk, and his personal fads, eccentrici-
ties, amusements and even his private life. By 
such pictures an audience would be amused and 
the maker of the films and exhibitors would be 
enriched. The greater the exaggeration in such a 
series of pictures, so long as they were not libel-
ous, the greater would be the profit of the picture 
maker and exhibitor. 
''We hold that the name and picture of the 
plaintiff were used by the defendant as a matter 
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of business and profit and contrary to the pro-
hibitions of the statute. 
' 'It is urged that there is danger of serious 
trouble in the practicable enforcement of any rule 
which may be adopted in construing and enforc-
ing the statute so far as it relates to purposes of 
trade. If there is any basis for the suggestion of 
danger in enforcing a part of the statute under 
consideration, it is the duty of the Legislature to 
repeal such part thereof, or so modify it as to 
define with greater particularity which it intends 
should be prohibited, or perhaps permit the use 
of a person's name, portrait or picture for pur-
poses of trade if the oral assent of such person, 
or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, 
is obtained therefor." 
In the case of Krieger vs. Popular Publications, 3 
N.Y.S. (2d) 480, the complaint alleged, among other 
things, that the defendant "without first having obtained 
the written consent of the plaintiff knowingly used the 
name of the plaintiff within the State of New York for 
purposes of trade and for advertising purposes''. The 
court stated therein: 
"It has been held for example that the use of 
plaintiff's name and picture in connection with 
the dissemination of news or the depicting of cur-
rent events is a legitimate use under the statute 
(Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 178 N.Y.S. 
752) but not where there has been a dramatization 
of an actual event using the name and likeness of 
a person who played an important role therein. 
(Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y.S. 
51, 103 N.E. 1108.) 
"In the present case there is nothing indicated 
that the story attacked describes a current event 
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or is of such g·eneral ne,vs interest or imparts 
such information as to come within the allowable 
area of the statute. On the contrary, it may be 
reasonably inferred from the complaint that it is 
fiction. .I\s such it would come within the class of 
cases in which a recovery may be had. Sarat 
Lahiri Y. Daily lVIirror, Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 382, 162 
niisc. 776. 
"' 
"It is true that with respect to fiction, recovery 
has been denied, where in a novel of almost 400 
pages the name of the plaintiff was used but once, 
(Damron v. Doubleday Doren & Co., Inc., 231 
N.Y.S. 444, affirmed 226 App. Div. 796, 234 N.Y.S. 
773) ; and in a 9ase 'vhere the full name o{ the 
plaintiff (with middle initial omitted) appeared 
'only in the cast of characters' of a book of un-
usual leng-th without any parallels between the 
plaintiff and the character depicted in the book. 
(Swacker v. Wright, 277 N.Y.S. 296.)" 
In the case of Sidis v. F. R. Publishing Corporation, 
113 Fed. (2) 806, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second 
Circuit, said: 
"In this context, it is clear that 'for purposes 
of trade' does not contemplate the publication of 
a newspaper, magazine or book which imparts 
truthfully news or other factual information to 
the public. Although a publisher sells a com-
modity and expects to profit from the sale of his 
product he is immune from the interdict of Sec-
tions 50 and 51 so long as he confines himself to 
the unembroidered dissemination of facts. Pub-
lishers and motion picture producers have occa-
sionally been held to transgress the statutes in 
New York but in each case the factual presenta-
tion was embellished by some degree of fictional-
. . 
I Zing. 
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''The New Yorker's articles limit themselves 
to the unvarnished, unfictionalized truth.'' 
In the case of Koussevitzky vs. Allen, Towne & 
Heath, Inc., et al., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S. (2) 779, the 
court said: 
"The right of privacy statute does not apply 
to unauthorized biography for a public figure un-
less the biography is fictional or novelized in 
character.'' 
In the case of Malony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc., 
98 N.Y.S. (2) 119, plaintiff brought action under the 
right of privacy statute because of the portrayal of 
plaintiff by Independent Comic Magazine as a hero in 
an airplane disaster at the Empire State Building in 
which plaintiff was a national figure. The Supreme 
Court found for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed 
to the Appellate Division which reversed the case and 
held that there was no violation of Sections 50 and 51. 
The plaintiff was the most celebrated hero of the dis-
aster. The defendant published in a magazine five pages 
of pictures which were not actual photographs but were 
symbolic sketches. The script was taken from the news-
paper accounts of the tragedy at the time. The defendant 
appealed from the judgment for the plaintiff on the 
ground that the account in his magazine was a true nar-
ration of an event of general interest in which plaintiff 
had been widely and prominently featured in the public 
press. The court said: 
"It does not follow that plaintiff's exploit has 
been fictionalized merely for the reason that it has 
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been told through a form of picture writing which 
is as old as the human rare. 
''The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to 
establish his cause of action 'vhich means that it 
is encumbent upon him to show that the article 
is based upon fiction rather than fact. * * * Only 
in minor particulars has plaintiff shown inaccur-
acy.'' 
The majority opinion of the court in discussing this 
. point at page 10 of the Decision used the following 
language: 
"While the fact that one is a public figure does 
not, in our opinion, ·take him outside the statute 
or justify the commercial exploitation of his per-
sonality, such as the publication of his picture in 
connection with an advertisement of a commodity, 
it may create such a legitimate public interest 
"\Yith respect to him and his public career that a 
biography of his life, not fictional nor novelized 
although published or portrayed without his con-
sent, shall be regarded as informative and educa-
tional in character and the publication thereof as 
not constituting commercial exploitation.'' 
If this correctly states the law, by what test is it 
to be determined that the purported biography is fic-
tional or novelized and who is to determine that fact 1 
If the facts are not in dispute, as in this case, it is a la'v 
question for the court. If the facts are disputed it is a 
jury question under clear and uncontradictory instruc-
ticns. 
Instead of bringing witnesses to testify that the 
picture "Tas actually a biography of Jack Donahue, which 
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it obviously was not, or that it was put out for educa-
ti"lnal purposes, which it certainly was not, or that it 
"as a news item relating to a deceased individual who 
bad attained fame, which it was not, they drew a red 
herring across the path of the trial judge and jury by 
bringing in a group of individuals to testify as to the 
Rducational, biographical and informative value of the 
:film for purposes other than the purpose for which it 
was actually made and for uses other than the use to 
which it was actually put. This was done over objection 
of plaintiffs. It had the desired effect. 
The obvious purpose was to draw the attention of 
the trial court and jury from the use that was actually 
made of the :film and the purpose for which it was actually 
produced to uses and purposes which might be made. 
The constitutional question, if such there was, in this 
connection, should have been for the court, not the jury, 
upon the undisputed facts. The purpose, of course, was 
to over-awe or overwhelm the court and jury which would 
result from a proper interpretation of the law. 
If the legislature intended the statute to have no 
application to movies, etc., or to biographical novels or 
to matters that are educational in the sense that all ex-
periences in life are educational, one way or another, it 
is for the Utah legislature to amend the statute to make 
the exclusion. Until it does so these cases should he 
decided within the framework of the statute in the light 
of applicable decided cases. 
78 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This phase of the question was amply considered 
and decided in the case by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. It is a case directly in point in this case. 
Under the New York Statute, the cases are clear 
that as long as a person lives who is not a famous person 
or public character, you cannot invade his right of 
privacy by making his private life public in any way. 
The only limitation upon portraying the life of a 
famous person is that you must tell the truth about the 
facts of his life-you cannot fictionalize by drawing out 
of your own wild imagination and attribute those wild 
imaginings to the life of that public or famous person. 
When a man runs for public office, he invites the 
public whose favor he seeks to examine his whole life's 
record to determine his fitness for the public office and 
all the incidents of his private life become public. 
When a man becomes famous for other reasons, not 
because he is running for public office, the facts of his 
life for which he has become famous, then become more 
or less public property and as to those incidents in his 
life, the right of privacy seems to be a misnomer. But 
he is fully protected by the New York statute and the 
Utah statute and by judicial decisions without statute 
against untruths and against using his name for adver-
tising, commercial and trade purposes and the New York 
decisions are unanimous and without dissent on this 
point. Neither can you fictionalize his life. 
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Falsehood and untruths about the life of any man, 
whether living or dead, are not educational and informa-
tive, neither do they add to the cuture of society. 
If the Declaratory Judgment is sound then there 
would be no law of privacy in this State, nor could any 
protective statute be enacted so far as the movie industry 
is concerned. Under that theory the authors and moving 
picture producers determine the law of privacy and not 
the legislature or the courts. Under that theory any 
person who has been prominent loses his name and it 
becomes public property in spite of himself, to do with 
it as the public pleases, to be fictionalized, exploited for 
profit, misrepresented, distorted, used for commercial, 
advertising and trade purposes. The Utah Statute means 
what it says and under it, a man's name cannot be used 
for these purposes. 
A famous man's name may be used and a true biog-
raphy of him written, but in using his name and writing 
his biography the Utah statute requires t~at you must 
tell the truth about him and not fictionalize about him 
and not use his name for exploitation, advertising and 
trade purposes. Biographers should not be permitted 
to fictionalize, which is another way of saying they should 
not be allo"\\red to create a new person out of their own 
vivid imaginings. 
Moving picture companies make such pictures as 
the Donahue picture for profit only and they will make 
and sell anything that ""ill make money for them. It is 
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not educational and informative. It is not cultural. It is 
plain dollars and cents with them-commercial profit. 
Educational pictures are made mainly for schools 
and colleges and are almost never financially successful 
and p~ofita ble. Warner Bros. did not make this picture 
for such purpose. They make pictures for profit only 
and in order to make profit they must fictionalize their 
subjects where they use the names of real persons. The 
lives of people, even though they may . become famous, 
are in the minds of scenario writers too drab for profit. 
Such lives must be fictionalized and exaggerated and as 
the court said in the Binns case, 210 N.Y.S. 51; 103 N. E. 
1108 : ''The greater the exaggeration . . . the greater 
would be the profit of the picture maker and exhibitors.'' 
May we briefly summarize our understanding of the 
law on this point: Under ·our statute and under the 
common law relating to privacy if the actual use is .for 
purposes of trade the truth is no defense and it makes 
no difference whether the victim is famous or not. Fic-
tionalization is material only on the question of damages. 
If the use is not for purposes of trade but it is contended 
that the use "ras as a news item, fictionalization destroys 
that purported defense. If it is contended that the use 
was for biographical purposes or as a part of the educa-
tional system, fictionalization destroys that purported 
defense. 
The trial court in this case correctly stated the law 
in its instructions 5, 6, and 7; then destroyed what it had 
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said by instructing the jury in its instructions 2 and 3 
that unless we showed that it was :fictional we could not 
recover; and in the Declaratory Judgment went all the 
way, which was certainly erroneous. 
POINTS 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 24, 25 and 26 
THE APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 76-4-8 and 9 
TO THE DISTRIBUTION AND EXHIBITION FOR 
PURPOSES OF TRADE OF FEATURE MOTION 
PICTURES SIMILAR TO ''LOOK FOR THE SILVER 
LINING" DOES NOT CONTRAVENE THE FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS PROVISIONS OF 
THE UTAH STATE AND UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTIONS. 
The constitutional question entered the pictures in 
three ways: 
(a) The provisions in the declaratory judgment to 
the effect that the Utah statute has no applicability to 
exhibition of the picture by defendants in the manner 
and for the purposes alleged, by reason of the constitu-
tional provisions relating to freedom of press and speech. 
{b) The evidence of the expert witnesses produced 
by defendants as to the nature of the picture as having 
educational and biographical value. 
(c) The court's instructions relating to the statute 
as limited by the constitutional provisions. 
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Appellants respectfully urge that the trial court 
'vas in error in its conception of the constitutional ques-
tion as it applied the same in all three particulars. 
In the first place the constitutional question was one 
of la"~ for the court. In the second place, it had nothing 
to do 'vith the case under the undisputed facts. In the 
third place, the court should not have admitted expert 
witnesses to testify as to the educational or biographical 
nature of the picture; and in the fourth place the court 
improperly instructed the jury that the Utah statute 
would not be violated if the picture was educational or 
biographical in character by reason of the constitutional 
provisions relating to freedom of speech and press. 
The trial court was misled by and misinterpreted 
the effect of cases recently decided by the Supreme Court 
of the United States, holding that the movie industry 
is entitled to the protection of the constitutional provi-
sions relating to freedom of the press and that States 
may not censor their product in advance of showing. 
There should have been nothing about those cases which 
should have led the trial court to make the rulings which 
it made. 
Defendants pleaded in their answer that the Utah 
statute, if applied to uses of this type, would be in vio-
lation of the Federal and State constitutions relating 
to freedom of speech and press. 
The question was argued to the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals and directly answered by that court. 
83 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It was again argued to Judge Martin Larson on pre-
liminary motion under the pleadings, who ruled (R. 68) 
that the statute does not violate the constitutional pro-
visions as applied to the case at bar. In the trial of the 
case Judge Van Cott took the view that it was a jury 
question and then in the declaratory judgment ruled 
that the defendants, under the constitutions, had an 
absolute right to use the name and exhibit the picture 
in the manner shown. 
Defendants asserted below, and the trial court's 
paragraph 3 of its declaratory judgment holds, that the 
publication or exhibition of this picture, or similar 
feature pictures, because of its biographical, educational 
or informative values, was protected by the freedom of 
speech and press provisions of the Utah State and United 
States Constitutions. 
In its instructions to the jury the trial court stated 
the la-'v one way, leaving it to the jury to decide, and in 
its declaratory judgment the trial court took a different 
view of the la,v. There is complete conflict between the 
two pronouncements of the trial court on this subject. 
The trial court was in error on both pronouncements. 
On the undisputed facts it should have been a law ques-
tion for the court. If the law was as announced by th{:\ 
court in its declaratory judgment it should have granted 
the motion of defendants for a dismissal of thP case at 
the close of plaintiffs' evidence. If it was not, it should 
have directed a verdict for plaintiffs, leaving only thP 
matter of damages to the jury. The evidence of defend-
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ants added nothing to the facts of the case. It was 
directed entirely to opinion and argument. The facts 
'vere undisputed. The nature of the film, the purpose 
and nature of the exhibitions were not contradicted or 
varied by the opinion evidence, which will be discussed 
elsewhere herein. 
No one from Warner Brothers, either the company 
that made it or the company that exhibited it, testified 
in this case. No one testified that it was. created or 
exhibited as a. biography, which it "\Vas not, or as a news-
reel, or for educational purposes. It "\Vas a commercial 
film exhibited for what it would bring as a box office 
attraction for the financial gain of the maker, distributor 
and exhibitors. 
The most that can be said for the opinion evidence 
of the so-called experts is that it, as a film, has educa-
tional value within the broad definition of education that 
everything is educational in one way or another, and 
that it could be used to show to students for their enter-
tainment or to show them fancy dance steps or dramatic 
appeal; that it could be used in educational institutions 
to show how music and dramatic art were produced by 
great stars of the 1920's and 1930's; and that it did deal 
with what was purported to be the doings of two deceased 
stars, fictionalized to increase the appeal. 
This is not what the freedom of press and speech 
provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions have 
excluded from the legislative power of enactment. 
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News events, whether contained in newspapers, 
newsreels put out by the motion picture industry or pic-
torial magazines, are protected. 
Humiston v. Universal Film Exchange, infra. 
True biographies of famous individuals, living and 
deceased, are protected. 
Sidis v. F-R Publication Co., 113 Fed. 2d 806. 
Educational matter prepared and distributed for 
use in educational institutions for purposes of instruc-
tion may be protected. 
While it has been recognized that motion pictures 
are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed 
by the 1st and 14th amendments, 
U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 92 Law 
Ed. 1260 
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 96 Law Ed. 1098 
they are not sancrosanct. As said by the court in Burstyn 
v. Wilson, 
''To hold that liberty of expression by means 
of motion pictures is guaranteed by the 1st and 
14th amendments, however, is not the end of our 
problem. It does not follow that the constitution 
requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion 
picture of every kind at all times and at all 
places.'' 343 U. S. 495, 502. 
All that has been squarely decided by the Supreme 
Court is that a State violates the constitutional guaran-
tee of free speech and press if it bans a motion pi('t urP 
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on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is "sacrile-
gious", Burstyn v. Wilson, supra, or that it is "of such 
character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the 
people''. 
Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960, 96 Law Ed. 1359. 
As stated by Mr. Justice Murphy for a unanimous 
court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 
571, 86 Law Ed. 1031, 1034: 
''There are certain well defined and narrowly 
limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which can never be thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem. These include the 
lewd and obscene, the libelous and the insulting or 
'fighting' words, those which by their very utter-
ance inflict injuries or intend to incite an imme-
diate breach of peace. '' 
So, in the case at bar, if Warner Bros. and the other 
defendants seek to profit by the commercialization of 
the name and story of Jack Donahue, and by the invasion 
of the privacy of his widow and children by a fictionalized 
motion picture musical without their consent, they do so 
at the risk of liability. No conflict with constitutional 
freedom is made by the imposition of such liability. 
The Circuit Court in the majority opinion pointed 
this up succinctly in its ruling on the constitutional issue 
raised by defendants in this very case: 
"If the statute undertook to restrict or forbid 
the publication of matters educational or infor-
mative or strictly biographical in character, or 
the dissemination of news in the form of a news-
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reel or otherwise, it would be open to challenge 
on the ground of objectionable restraint upon the 
freedom of speech and press. But it does nothing 
of the kind. It is content to forbid the appropria-
tion of the name, picture, or personality of an 
individual for commercial purposes, or for pur-
poses of trade, as distinguished· from the publica-
tion of matters educational or informative or 
purely biographical in kind, or the dissemination 
of news in the form pf a newsreel or otherwise. 
And the Constitutional guaranty of free speech 
and free press in its full sweep does not undertake 
to create an inviolate asylum for unbridled appro-
priation or exploitation of the name, picture, or 
personality of a deceased public figure for purely 
commercial purposes, or solely for purposes of 
trade, with the state powerless to enact appropri-
ate forbidding or remedial legislation.'' 
It has been shown that the . picture "Look for the 
Silver Lining", and motion pictures like it, are not ne\YS-
reels or put out to disseminate news. While the "ex-
perts'' presented by defendants testified at great length 
as to the picture's educational value, no one testified 
that the use by defendants to which plaintiffs object, i.e., 
the commercial showing at motion picture theatres for 
trade or profit, was for educational purposes, nor was it, 
or are films similar to it, biographical in the sense of a 
biography within the constitutional prot~ction. 
Webster defines a biography as ''the written history 
of a person's life''. 
How the· picture might have been, or \vhat rutting 
or other doctoring might make it useful for educational 
or historical purposes, is not the issue in this case. Nor 
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was it a proper issue as to what use might be made of 
the picture. What the statute proscribes is the use of a 
name for trade or profit and its use for trade or profit 
in a commercial feature picture like ''Look for the Silver 
I .. ining" or other Warner Brothers musicals of the same 
type, the use of which plaintiffs complain. It is submitted 
that such proscription by the Utah statute is not in vio-
lation of either the Utah State or the Federal Consti-
tutions. 
The damage action was based upon the use actually 
made of the name of Jack Donahue. Evidence as to uses 
that might or could be made of the picture was beside 
the issue and the court should have sustained the objec-
tion made by plaintiffs to such evidence. 
Had we been suing one of the educational institu-
tions for using the name in connection with exhibition 
of the picture, the evidence of the experts as to the edu-
cational and biographical value of the film in connection 
with its courses of instruction, or perhaps even its extra-
curricular activities, might have been germane to the 
ISSUe. 
Had we been seeking au injunction against licensing 
the film for any and all purposes, the maker and distribu-
tor could undoubtedly have properly presented such evi-
dence as a basis for exclusion of educational institutions 
from operation of the injunctive process. 
However, in this case, where the use actually made 
was commercial, not only admitted but expressly alleged 
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by defendants in their pleadings, the evidence as to what 
uses might or could be made of the picture was beside 
the issue. 
Educational purposes, within the purview of the 
constitutional provisions relating to freedom of speech, 
are not broad and undefined, as described in the evidence 
of Dr. Wheelwright, which included everything that af-
fects the human mind, body and character. The educa-
tional uses which should come within the protective 
features should be those which are a part of the activities 
of educational institutions as such, where students are 
taught in prescribed courses of study - the same stand-
ards as those prescribed for exemption from taxation. 
Otherwise every activity of life would be an open field. 
The cases and decisions on this subject as related to the 
law of privacy leave no doubt as to the limitations beyond 
which even movies, newspapers and broadcasters may 
not go. 
In fact the educational value of the film, as actually 
used, was not a proper subject matter for the jury to 
consider. Educational institutions as such are exempt 
from taxation, but that does not mean that every activity 
that is educational in nature is exempt. The courts have 
limited that right to institutions created by la\v for such 
purpose and where the proceeds derived from tuitions 
and other revenues from their activities are retained by 
the institutions and used exclusively for educational pur-
poses. 
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Lois Grunow Mem. Clinic v. Oglesby, 42 Ariz. 98, 
22 Pac. 2d 1076: 
''An educational institution has been judicially 
defined as one which teaches and improves its 
pupils; a school, seminary, college or educational 
establishment." (Italics ours) 
Educational institutions as such are generally im-
mune from tort liability because, as was stated by this 
court in the recent case of Bingham v. Board of Educa-
tion of Ogden City, ______ Utah ______ , 223 Pac. 2d 432, in 
providing education for students of school age the Board 
of Education is performing a governmental function. As 
such it is protected, said the court, by a provision of the 
State constitution. Two Justices of this court felt that 
the doctrine of immunity there announced was obsolete 
and should be repudiated. If the doctrine announced by 
the declaratory judgment and as set forth in instruction 
No. 3 is correct, then the immunity is extended, under 
the free press and speech provisions, to every establish-
ment or agency that can show that its activities have 
educational value or to which students may resort for 
their entertainment without injury to their moral char-
acter. 
The broad general objectives of education are set 
forth in the Statutes of Utah. Students shall be taught 
the constitution (Sec. 53-1-1); 'they shall be taught health, 
citizenship, vocations, worthy use of leisure, worthy 
home-membership, ethical character and the fundamental 
processes or tools of education (Sec. 53-14-9); and in 
doing so they incorporate the same into the regular 
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courses of study and may make use of the usual means 
of instruction, including ''visual education aids''. Does 
this mean that every activity in life that accomplishes or 
helps to accomplish any of those broad general principles 
of splendid manhood or womanhood thereby becomes an 
educational institution 1 The answer is so obvious as to 
amount to the ludicrous. 
The trial court gave to the jury no guide or defini-
tion to limit their thinking on this subject but simply 
told them that if the picture had educational value the 
Utah statute would not apply. The courts have gone to 
no such end in their protection of education. 
We submit that, the facts being undisputed, the 
court should have rejected the evidence in the first place 
in response to the objections interposed; should have 
instructed the jury as a matter of law that the constitu-
tional provisions had nothing to do with their delibera-
tions on the damage side of this case. 
Plaintiffs requested the trial court, in their request 
No. 15, (R. 137) to give to the jury a proper guide as to 
the meaning of the educational purposes referred to in 
the law and that the use shown by the evidence in this 
case would not constitute an educational use, but the 
trial court refused that instruction to the jury and gave 
no other guide for them in their deliberations. This was 
error. It was prejudicial. If the issue was for the jury 
at all, the court should have told them what the tt\rm 
meant, as a legal proposition. 
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POINT 10 (g) 
THERE IS NO CONFLICT OF LAW QUESTION 
RAISED IN THIS CASE AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN ITS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN 
DECREEING THAT THE RIGHTS AND LIABILI-
TIES OF THE PARTIES BE DETERMINED BY 
THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF IN JURY TO PLAIN-
TIFFS' FEELINGS. 
The trial court assumed that there is a conflict of 
la-\YS question in this action. It has declared that the 
"applicable" conflict of laws rule requires that the rights 
and liabilities of the parties be determined by the law 
of the place where plaintiffs sustained injury and 
damage to their feelings and sensibilities, viz., Cali-
fornia. 
This is equivalent to saying that in privacy cases no 
cause of action lies in the State where the disclosure 
occurs or where the name is used for commercial pur-
poses unless the plaintiff is a resident of such State. 
We submit that such is not the law, as it is not the law 
in defamation and other actions involving personal rights 
or property rights. The cause of action arises where the 
tort is committed or the rights are violated. 
This question was presented to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in this case and was answered in the 
following language: 
"It is well within the competence of Utah to 
forbid commercial exploitation in that state of 
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the kind alleged in the amended complaint and to 
provide a remedy in its courts, without regard to 
whether like exploitation had previously occurred 
in another state in which no like remedy was af-
forded. Utah was not powerless to prohibit appro-
priation in that state of the name or picture of a 
person for purposes of trade, and to provide a 
remedy in its courts for a wrong of that kind even 
though similar appropriation had previously 
taken place in another state where no remedy was 
available. And section 103-4-9 will be searched in 
vain for any legislative intent or purpose to ex-
clude from its remedial reach instances of ex-
ploitation in which the seal of privacy had already 
been broken in another state where no relief could 
be had under domestic law. The statute does not 
provide that the heirs of a deceased relative may 
maintain an action of this kind if the law of the 
state where the seal of privacy was first broken 
creates or recognizes such right of action and pro-
vides a remedy for its enforcement. It does not 
contain any limitation or exception of that kind. 
It is couc;tJ.ed in broad general language and indi-
cates clearly a studied purpose on the part of the 
legislature to create the right in heirs of a de-
ceased person to maintain an action of this kind 
for the violation of the right of privacy occurring 
in that state, without regard to the law of another 
state.'' (Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 
Fed. 2d 6, at 13.) 
The conflict of laws rule to which the trial court is 
apparently referring in its declaratory judgment is that 
of the choice of law. Such a decision faees a forum in a 
tort case in two, and only t"·o possible cir<'umstanres. 
First, it may present itself where all of the eVPHts creat-
ing· the alleged liability occur \vithin one jurisrliction, 
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but where the forum is a separate jurisdiction. Second, 
it may present itself where the events creating the alleged 
liability occur within more than one jurisdiction, and the 
forum is either one of the jurisdictions in which these 
events occurred, or in a third jurisdiction in which none 
of the events transpired. 
The former situation is the simpler of the two. Our 
courts have held that in such situations, the court of the 
forum will enforce rights and duties in accordance with 
the la'v of the place where the tort occurred. 
It is also clear that where the locus delicti and the 
forum are identical, there is no question of a choice of 
law, and thus no question of conflict of laws. This is the 
case in the instant situation, and for purposes of a 
declaratory judgment by this court interpreting the Utah 
statute, is the case in any situation where the use of the 
name, picture or portrait for purposes of trade occurs 
within the State of Utah. 
This case involves a publication within the State of 
Utah allegedly contrary to the provisions of a Utah 
statute. The only non-Utah elements in this case are 
the facts that plaintiffs saw the picture in California and 
are not Utah domiciliaries. Defendants stipulated that 
the Utah shown picture was the same as the one seen 
by plaintiff in California and plaintiffs testified that they 
were informed of the Utah exhibition and of their reac-
tions to the Utah showing. If the tort were committed 
wholly within Utah, it is irrelevant where plaintiffs are 
domiciled, unless this court shall find an express statutory 
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the kind alleged in the amended complaint and to 
provide a remedy in its courts, without regard to 
whether like exploitation had previously occurred 
in another state in which no like remedy was af-
forded. Utah was not powerless to prohibit appro-
priation in that state of the name or picture of a 
person for purposes of trade, and to provide a 
remedy in its courts for a wrong of that kind even 
though similar appropriation had previously 
taken place in another state where no remedy was 
available. And section 103-4-9 will be searched in 
vain for any legislative intent or purpose to ex-
clude from its remedial reach instances of ex-
ploitation in which the seal of privacy had already 
been broken in another state where no relief could 
be had under domestic law. The statute does not 
provide that the heirs of a deceased relative may 
maintain an action of this kind if the law of the 
state where the seal of privacy was first broken 
creates or recognizes such right of action and pro-
vides a remedy for its enforcement. It does not 
contain any limitation or exception of that kind. 
It is couc;lJ.ed in broad general language and indi-
cates clearly a studied purpose on the part of the 
legislature to create the right in heirs of a de-
ceased person to maintain an action of this kind 
for the violation of the right of privacy occurring 
in that state, without regard to the law of another 
state.'' (Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 
Fed. 2d 6, at 13.) 
The conflict of laws rule to which the trial court is 
apparently referring in its declaratory judgment is that 
of the choice of law. Such a decision faces a forum in a 
tort case in two, and only t"'o possible circumstances. 
First, it may present itself where all of the ev-ents creat-
ing the alleged liability occur within one jurisdirt ion, 
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but where the forum is a separate jurisdiction. Second, 
it may present itself where the events creating the alleged 
liability occur within more than one jurisdiction, and the 
forum is either one of the jurisdictions in which these 
events occurred, or in a third jurisdiction in which none 
of the events transpired. 
The former situation is the simpler of the two. Our 
courts have held that in such situations, the court of the 
forum will enforce rights and duties in accordance with 
the la'v of the place where the tort occurred. 
It is also clear that where the locus delicti and the 
forum are identical, there is no question of a choice of 
law, and thus no question of conflict of laws. This is the 
case in the instant situation, and for purposes of a 
declaratory judgment by this court interpreting the Utah 
statute, is the case in any situation where the use of the 
name, picture or portrait for purposes of trade occurs 
within the State of Utah. 
This case involves a publication within the State of 
Utah allegedly contrary to the provisions of a Utah 
statute. The only non-Utah elements in this case are 
the facts that plaintiffs saw the picture in California and 
are not Utah domiciliaries. Defendants stipulated that 
the Utah shown picture was the same as the one seen 
by plaintiff in California and plaintiffs testified that they 
were informed of the Utah exhibition and of their reac-
tions to the Utah showing. If the tort were committed 
wholly within Utah, it is irrelevant where plaintiffs are 
domiciled, unless this court shall find an express statutory 
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intent, separate and apart from the question of conflict of 
laws, to limit the cause of action to Utah domiciliaries. 
In deciding the existence of either of the two circum-
stances in which a choice of law question exists, one in-
evitably must make a decision as to the substantive 
nature of the tort. First, if this court holds that "any 
injury'' allows recovery for infringement of a property 
right, as well as for injury to feelings, a point which is 
argued in detail elsewhere in this brief, it is clear that 
to the extent that the action is for said property damage, 
that the locus of the injury is the place of publication. 
Even without the existence of a property right, in 
a case of Utah publication it is clear that no conflicts 
question arises. The standard rule of choice of la'v in 
questions of tort is to look to the ''place of wrong''. 
~.,or purposes of convenience only, this place has been 
defined as the state where the last event necessary to 
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place ( Re-
statement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, A. L. I., Sec. 
377). Under that section is the following comment: 
''a. Each state has legislative jurisdiction to 
determine the legal effect of acts done or events 
caused within its territory (see sec. 64). If conse-
quences of an act done in one state occur in an-
other state, each state in which any event in the 
series of act and consequences occurs may exer-
cise legislative jurisdiction to create rights or 
other interests as a result thereof (see sec. 65). 
Thus, both the state in which the actor acts and 
the state in which legal consequences of his act 
occur have legislative jurisdiction to impose an 
obligation to pay for harm caused thereby. If any 
state having legislative jurisdiction so to do im-
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poses a right-duty relation delictual in character, 
other states will recognize the existence of such 
relation under the rules stated in sees. 377 to 390.'' 
What is the last act necessary to execute this Utah 
statutory right of action 1 For guidance, one may look 
to certain common la'v privacy cases, where the right 
has not been expanded by statute to include property 
rights, as plaintiffs contend is the case here. American 
Jurisprudence appears to give the answer cursorily. ''In 
order to recover for an invasion of the right of privacy, 
it is not necessary for the plaintiff to allege or to prove 
special damages.'' ( 41 Am. J ur. 934, Sec. 11). If indeed 
special damages were necessary, we would have at com-
mon law an unquestioned link with the feelings of the 
heirs, and no action would lie without them. However, 
such is not the case, and the tort of invasion of privacy 
is completed and a cause of action lies upon the publi-
cation by defendant. Probably the most thorough analy-
sis of the instant problem states : ''Since invasions of 
privacy and defamation actionable per se cannot require 
proof of special damage, the impact may be said to occur 
when the wrongful idea has been made public or com-
municated to other persons.'' ( 60 H.L.R. 941, a.t 944). 
Impact is more clearly defined earlier: ''Although the 
word 'impact' is more conveniently used in referring to 
interference with tangible interests since a physical 
impact is readily observable, it may also be used to 
describe the point of which there has been a sufficient 
invasion of the intangible rights to create liability.'' 
(Ibid. p. 943, n. 23.) At page 947, the note refers to 
''impact, the technical completion of the tort ... '' 
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The Restatement comment after Sec. 377 shows that 
the "last event" varies with the type o! tort involved. 
Thus, where a person sustained bodily harm, the place 
of wrong is the place where the harmful force takes effect 
on the body. (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of 
Laws, A.L.I., Sec. 377, Comment, Par. 1.) The restate-
ment cites other types of tort, including poison, harm to 
land or chattels and loss by fraud, all of which place 
different rules as to the determination of the "last 
event''. Significantly, paragraph five of the comment 
of that section states : 
''Where harm is done to the reputation of a 
person, the place of wrong is where the defama-
tory statement is communicated. 
''For example, A broadcasting in state X 
slanders B. B is well and favorably known in 
State Y and the broadcast is heard there by many 
people conversant with B 's good repute. The 
place of wrong is Y. '' 
This does not expressly cover the right of privacy. 
However, it is submitted that in picking a rule as to 
choice of law, there is no question that an analogy from 
the law of defamation is immensely superior to that of 
physical personal injury. 
The Restatement definition of the common law right 
of privacy is ''a person who unreasonably and seriously 
interferes with another's interest in not having his 
affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the 
public is liable to the other.'' (Restatement of Torts, 
Sec. 867.) Note that the actionable "yords are "known" 
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and "exhibited". Of the actionable examples contained 
in this section of the Restatement, each describes the 
tort by the verb ''publishes'' or ''shows''. The sole 
reference to plaintiff's feelings in this section is in the 
comment ".,.here it is stated that "liability exists only if 
the defendant's conduct was such that he should have 
realized that it "-ould be offensive to persons of ordinary 
sensibilities". (Restatement of Torts, Sec. 867, Comment 
D, page 400.) This is a question of fact which makes no 
reference to the actual injury to feelings of plaintiffs, 
which is solely a question in the measure of damages, 
once liability has been created. Whether defendant 
should have realized the resulting offensive nature of 
the act is not a question which should be guided by the 
law of plaintiff's residence any more than by the law 
of Tibet; it is in essence the test of reasonableness to be 
applied as a limitation of the common law right created 
in the place of publication. 
Thus, the tort having been committed and tried in 
one jurisdiction, the common law right of privacy would 
create no conflicts of laws question in this case under 
either of the two possible circumstances. One must then 
ask, is this right restricted and confined to Utah resi-
dents by the statute now before this court~ It is clear 
that this was certainly not the general intention of the 
Legislature. It codified a right which at that time was 
recognized in only a very few jurisdictions as a common 
law right, thus, in effect, removing from the courts the 
privilege of stating that such a right does not exist in 
Utah. The legislature utilized almost word for word a 
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statute just previously passed in the State of New York. 
All of the significant variations from the New York 
statute were changes which enlarged the scope of the 
action. In the light of this, to uphold the trial court's 
interpretation of the statute, this court must hold that 
the words ' 'used within this state ' ' mean something dif-
ferent than commonly interpreted, or that one must find 
a statutory intent to limit this right to Utah domiciliaries, 
although there is no reference whatsoever to such a limi-
tation. 
As to the former argument, the statute clearly states 
that one may ''maintain an action against'' a person ''so 
using'', to restrain ''the use'' of a name for purposes 
of trade ''within this state''. The statute further pro-
vides that a plaintiff may also recover damages for any 
injuries sustained ''by reason of such use (within the 
state)". 
Clearly, an action to enjoin further use is here pos-
sible without reference to injury. Blumenthal v. Picture 
Classics, 251 N.Y.S. 800, 235 App. Div. 570. To adopt 
the trial court's interpretation, one would hold that a 
suit under this statute for an injunction lies in Utah and 
creates no conflict of laws question, and thus is action-
able, while a suit for damages requires reference to the 
place of injured feelings (in this case, California), and 
thus is not actionable in Utah. To create two different 
conflict of laws rules for the same substantive law, de-
pending upon the type of relief sought is an absurdity. 
Moreover, the uniqueness of Utah's statute makes it 
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clear that in any action by out-of-state plaintiffs for a 
Utah publication, if the forum must refer to any other 
jurisdiction, the cause is effectively destroyed. 
As to the latter argument, it is submitted that the 
action .of the last legislature of this state makes its inten-
tion clear. A bill was introduced to amend the statute 
in question to restrict recovery to those cases where the 
person whose name is used, if deceased, died domiciled 
in the state. Even this proposed amendment did not 
restrict relief to heirs who are Utah domiciliaries (H. 
B. 89 - 1953 Legislature). This bill was amended so as 
to make this requirement less stringent, by providing 
alternatively that action would lie if the decedent had 
been a bona fide resident of Utah for twenty or more 
years (House Journal, 51st day, page 18). Even as so 
modified, this restrictive amendment failed of passage 
by a roll call of 37 to 20. It is submitted that there can 
be no more decisive evidence of a legislative intent to 
resist any attempt to restrict relief under this statute 
by use of the technique of domicile. 
Such a restriction would not reasonably be inferred 
from its absence, as the Virginia Legislature knew when 
it expressly limited their privacy statute to the protection 
of Virginia domiciliaries. Virginia Code, Section 5782 
(Michie, et al., 1942). 
It is submitted, therefore, that in any action brought 
in a Utah court for damages resulting from a violation 
of the statute by a publication in Utah, there is no prob-
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lem of choice of law. Reference need be made only to 
the Utah statute. 
POINTS 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 
THE EXPERT EVIDENCE HAD NO PLACE IN 
THE CASE AND WAS ARGUMENTATIVE IN 
NATURE. 
Assuming that the value of the film for educational 
purposes were a pertinent issue in a damage action for 
use of the name for commercial purposes, which we deny 
and have argued elsewhere in this brief, we submit that 
the trial court improperly permitted the witnesses 
Wheelwright, etc., in stating the reasons for their 
opinions, to make, in effect, arguments to the jury as 
to why no recovery should be had by plaintiffs in this 
case, upon the false assumption that the use made by 
defendants was educational in character. These witnesses 
all sought to convey the impression that if plaintiffs 
were to recover in this case that educational institutions 
would be deprived of films of an historic or biographical 
nature and that culture in this State would languish or 
die as a result. Of course no such thing would follow 
any more than it dies or languishes as a result of laws 
relating to the privacy of living individuals or as a result 
of copyright laws or those pertaining to trade names 
and the names of living individuals "\\7hich have acquired 
commercial value. 
There is a very simple an~·nrer and it applies alikP 
to the living and the dead so far as Utah is concernPcl. 
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If you intend to use or exploit a name for trade or com-
mercial purposes, obtain written permission so to do. 
The requirement for obtaining permission is not un-
reasonable. It is no different from the law as it pertains 
to other rights, personal and property. In fact this 
statute is very similar in many respects to the copyright 
J.a,v \Yhich protects man's mental creations against 
piracy by another. It too survives to the benefit of the 
widow and heirs and requires their permission for law-
ful use by another. The books are full of cases involving 
attempted piracy of values created by one person and 
attempted to be taken and exploited by another. The 
copyright law is very jealous in its protection of those 
rights; as is also the patent law in its protection of man's 
mechanical genius. Why, then, should not the most sacred 
right of all, one's good and valuable name, be a proper 
subject matter for legislative consideration~ The courts 
say that it is. The Supreme Court of the United States 
so states in the Sperry Hutchinson case, hereinbefore 
referred to. No amount of explanation by expert wit-
nesses as to how the enjoyable or ''worth while use of 
leisure time" is educational to all of us will save the 
situation. It still comes back to the question in a damage 
case, "What use was actually made~" If that actual use 
was for trade purposes, that is what determines the 
liability. 
In this case the reasons for the op1n1ons a.s given 
by the experts were argument and explanation, nothing 
more; and on a point not involved in the issues for the 
0 JUry. 
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The extent to which the trial court permitted these 
experts to go in their "reasons" for the opinions that 
they gave is well evidenced by a reading of Dr. Wheel-
wright's evidence. It was argument, and nothing more. 
The law books say that experts may give the reasons for 
their opinion within reasonable limitations. 
The trial court even permitted the witness Eaton 
to testify that the word ''trade'' as used in the statute 
does not comprehend the production of a play or movie. 
This was a law question for the court, but it went in just 
the same. 
He also permitted the witness Haight to testify that 
the movie had been approved by the L. D. S. Church for 
showing in Ward Houses. This was wholly irrelevant 
and hearsay, but it also went in. 
It was all beside the real point in issue and had no 
place in the case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH AND ELTON 
By H. A. Rich 
Attorneys for Appellants 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, 
MOFFAT & MABEY 
By Peter W. Billings 
Associate Counsel for 
Appella;n,ts on Brief 
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